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IMPOSTOR SCAMS
David Adam Friedman*

ABSTRACT
Impostor scams have recently become the most common type of consumer scam
in America, surpassing identity theft. It has never been easier and more profitable
to be an impostor scammer. Though the core of these scams dates back centuries,
these fraudsters consistently find novel ways to manipulate human motives and
emotions. Nonetheless, the public should not give up hope. Policymakers and
private actors can slow down this scourge if they focus on the key chokepoints that
impostor scammers rely upon to achieve their ends. This Article provides a
roadmap for a solution to impostor scams, offering specific suggestions for
mitigating this fraud today, while advocating the adoption of a “least-cost
avoider” approach to address the whole of the ongoing problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Impostors are scoundrels who pretend to be someone they are
not for their personal gain. They have been swindling Americans
1
out of their money and property for centuries. Today, however,
impostors are operating on a much broader scale, using new technology and hiding in distant jurisdictions. Impostor scams are now
public enemy number one—the most frequently reported category
of consumer fraud, according to the Federal Trade Commission
2
(FTC), even exceeding identify theft complaints. They account for
nearly $500 million in consumer losses, and that figure includes
3
only reported consumer losses, so total losses may be larger but impossible to measure.
In this Article, I explore how impostor scams are generally impossible to stop. Impostor tricks are diverse, clever, and innovative.
Public education has limitations. Technological advances in communications, the ascent of social media, and new payment systems
have supercharged the ability of scammers to commit fraud with
minimal downside. Impostors have never been able to reach so
many potential marks so inexpensively and with so little fear of
consequences from prosecution and enforcement.
In the days before the Internet, global telecommunication, and
advanced payment systems, impostor scams required perpetrators
to operate on a smaller scale and assume more risk. Imposture in
the flesh requires a deeper time investment and, quite often, direct
physical exposure to those who might unmask and report the impostor. Today, impostors can spam millions with their fraud attempts from a safe distance.

1. See EDWARD BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF
14–23 (2017) (describing the “shape-shifting, never-changing world of fraud”).
2. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2018, at 84
(2019).
3. See id. at 8, 84.
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Despite these complications, it is imperative for policymakers
and regulators to throw considerably more sand into the gears of
impostor scams. Although such efforts to eliminate them might
prove futile, failure to pursue them aggressively will only enable
their acceleration. Technological and educational interventions
from the public and private sectors can reduce the effectiveness of
impostor fraud efforts, thus raising the cost of implementing these
scams. Without sustained interventional efforts, impostor scams
will proliferate even faster. The goal should not be an unrealistic
elimination of impostor ploys that have durable core effectiveness.
Instead, the goal should be to reduce their incidence. The alternative, which would be to give up or let up, would enable the scammers to improve their methods and thrive.
The question turns to how to find the right levers and weapons
to reduce impostor fraud in what likely will be a perpetual struggle.
Certain common avenues or chokepoints can be throttled to raise
the costs of committing impostor fraud. Scammers often rely on
legitimate intermediaries in communications services and financial
transactions to achieve their ends. Policymakers, regulators, and
private actors themselves should ensure that intermediaries internalize some of the responsibility for slowing down impostor scammers. These intermediaries are the classic low-cost avoiders in this
scenario and are often best positioned, at the very least, to make
4
impostor scamming more expensive and difficult.
In Part I, I discuss the power of the impostor and the history of
the impostor scam. I describe the transformation of impostor
scams, in their various forms, into “public enemy number one.”
Part II explains how the economics of launching impostor scams
dramatically improved and why the scourge has become an epidemic. Part III discusses regulatory and enforcement efforts to address impostor fraud and why they have fallen short. In Part IV, I
suggest that waging a concerted war against impostor fraud is possible, and I offer specific tactical suggestions that put more burden
on telecommunications providers, social media platforms, and financial intermediaries to put their unique “chokepoint” positions
to good use.
Today, most losses from impostor fraud fall on the victims. By
shifting more responsibility on potentially preventative parties at
the chokepoints for impostor fraud, a least-cost-avoider-like approach could be adopted. Though no “silver bullet” exists to re-

4. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
135–40 (1970) (famously contending that the cost of accidents could be minimized by assigning liability to the cheapest cost avoiders).
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solve impostor fraud, as fraudsters will always innovate, I conclude
that mitigation of the problem may be quite possible.
I. THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF IMPOSTOR FRAUD
There is no doubt that impostor scams have become a top consumer fraud nuisance in the United States. Impostor scam reports
are up twenty-five percent since 2016, surpassing identity theft reports and replacing debt-collection complaints as the most com5
monly-reported consumer complaint. The Consumer Sentinel,
which aggregates federal and state data, counted over three mil6
lion total reports of fraud, identity theft, and other types of complaints in 2018. Fraud accounted for forty-eight percent of these
7
complaints by volume and identity theft for fifteen percent. Within the fraud category, the total 2018 reported losses from impostor
schemes towered over the rest at $488 million, nearly exceeding
the total losses associated with the other top ten types of fraud
8
combined.
Though the scale of the problem is new, impostor scams are as
old as the hills. As I discuss in Section I.A, impostor powers find
deep roots in our social history and constructs. Section I.B shows
how the underlying schemes from the nineteenth century still retain their same form today. In detailing the recent explosion of
impostor fraud that vaulted it to the current epidemic, in Section
I.C, I show that today’s impostor fraud just employs modern technology and social structures to use the same basic means to achieve
the same ends.
A. The American Impostor
Impostors have long captured the American imagination. In F.
Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, the protagonist, a con artist
from the Midwest, constructs a false identity as an Oxford graduate, a hero of the Great War, and an all-around “old sport,” wooing
old money socialites to cover his status as an organized crime fig5. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 84.
6. The FTC distinguishes “identity theft” from impostor fraud. The Sentinel describes
the identity theft scenario as when a scammer “appropriates . . . personal identifying information (like a Social Security number or credit card account number) to commit fraud or
theft.” Id. at 82. In effect, the difference, though subtle, is one of significance. The victim of
the impostor scam has been ripped off by someone claiming to be who they are not. The
victim of an identity theft scam has been ripped off by someone claiming to be that victim.
7. Id. at 4. Thirty-eight percent of complaints were tagged with “other.” Id.
8. Id.

SPRING 2021]

Impostor Scams

615

9
ure. The 2002 Steven Spielberg movie Catch Me if You Can, based
on the autobiography of Frank Abagnale, Jr., documented
Abagnale’s false impersonation of an airline pilot, an attorney, and
10
a physician, among other personas. More recently, an entire television series, Imposters, aired for two seasons on the Bravo net11
work. The protagonist of this show was a “persona-shifting con
artist” romance scammer pursued by “a trio of her recent, heart12
broken victims.”
Impostors have faked credentials to induce a major research
13
university into hiring them as a senior administrator, fooled the
14
media into covering ridiculous fake stories (long before the
emergence of the “fake news” concept-meme), and impersonated
government officials and new eyewitnesses to prank broadcasters
15
into putting them on the air. Whether for money, thrill-seeking,
or purposes of performance art, determined impostors can use
similar authority and confidence to achieve their ends. People
want to believe their stories, or they choose to believe their stories
because they seek heuristics to enable them to decide about whom
16
to listen or assign credibility. Though imposture and misuse of
authority presents all sorts of problems, I focus here on the fraudulent portrayal of identity to scam consumers out of their money.

9. See generally F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (1925).
10. CATCH ME IF YOU CAN (Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
11. Imposters, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5212822/ [https://perma.cc/83396ACP].
12. Imposters: Cast & Info, BRAVO, https://www.bravotv.com/imposters/about [https://
perma.cc/F9BD-AUA8].
13. Falsely claiming to hold advanced degrees from Tufts University and service as a
Navy SEAL, a highly-paid senior vice president for administration served as top adviser to
the president of Texas A&M University for over a year, until he was caught. Vimal Patel, Texas A&M Administrator Resigns amid Questions over Resume, THE EAGLE (June 18, 2010),
https://www.theeagle.com/news/a_m/a-m-administrator-resigns-amid-questions-overresume/article_b8fddfb5-95d9-58db-886d-1b1251b04a45.html
[https://perma.cc/EX3R8L9A]. Coincidentally, the author of this article briefly worked with this man in the private
sector in the 1990s and completely believed that he held these degrees from Tufts and that
he had served as a Navy SEAL.
14. See generally Margalit Fox, Alan Abel, Hoaxer Extraordinaire, Is (on Good Authority) Dead
at 94, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/obituaries/
alan-abel-dies.html (describing Alan Abel’s successful efforts to garner news coverage for his
hoaxes, including creating “Yetta Bronstein,” a fake candidate for the 1964 presidential election, a false claim that he won the New York state lottery, the creation of an advocacy group
that in the name of decency would cover up the private parts of animals, and faking his own
death and convincing the New York Times to run the obituary).
15. See Paul Farhi, Prank-call Legend Captain Janks Is Still a Nemesis of News Outlets, WASH.
POST (July 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/prank-call-legendcaptain-janks-is-still-a-nemesis-of-news-outlets/2014/07/30/a9ad9134-175e-11e4-9e3b-7f2
f110c6265_story.html [https://perma.cc/6JWA-36VS].
16. See Miriam J. Metzger, Andrew J. Flanagin & Ryan B. Medders, Social and Heuristic
Approaches to Credibility Evaluation Online, 60 J. COMMC’N 413 (2010).
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Historian Edward Balleisen observed that the consummation of
commerce, including consumer commerce, “depend[s] on trust in
17
far-flung counterparties across lengthening divides of space.” The
“complexity” of transactions and this general need for social trust
has always been ripe for exploitation by those who maintain asymmetric information, and consumers would expect a seller or authority figure, or one purporting to be such, to have that asymmet18
ric information. Impostor scams rely on the premise that
consumers trust those who seem to know more about a problem
than they do. Swindles “have been especially evident in sectors
dominated by complex products or services and characterized by
19
transactions among strangers.”
According to Balleisen, “the staying power of the dominant
forms of deception reflects enduring dilemmas about whom and
what to trust in a complex, integrated economy shot through with
20
inequalities of access to information.” A scammer pretending to
be affiliated with Microsoft, perhaps by spoofing Caller ID, or
simply, for example, claiming to be from Microsoft, would appear
to have asymmetric information; that is, the scammer counts on
having more information than the target. The trust engendered
can be exploited by scammers who are trying to gather personal
information or sell a phony fix. These common and “enduring
psychological [consumer] vulnerabilities” and “cognitive and emotional susceptibilities” have forced “industrialized and industrializing societies on every continent . . . [to] confront[] . . . commercial
21
misrepresentation.”
Balleisen centers his analysis on the “modern problem of trust in
22
the marketplace.” He points to more than century-old journalistic
accounts observing that there was a “perennial crop of fools” always
23
falling for “plausible cheats.” In 1859, one journalist wondered
how “the man of to-day, with all the lights of the past to guide him,
is just as much of a credulous idiot as at any time since the fall of
24
Adam?” In 1923, however, a reformed swindler observed that no
25
amount of education could defeat these schemes. William H.
Crosby, in the book, Confessions of a Confidence Man, noted that
“[e]very few months the newspapers and periodicals expose some

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

BALLEISEN, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 23–33.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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sort of bunko game. . . . The people are much better educated
than they used to be . . . . But the confidence game is greater than
26
ever . . . .” Perhaps people aren’t “credulous idiot[s]”—they are
rational actors who depend on a measure of trust to play in the
27
commercial economy. The schemes may change, but the psychology of scams does not.
In the nineteenth century, advancements in communication and
transportation enabled the geographic scope of transactions to expand, thus putting an increased number of strangers into contact
28
with other strangers. More frequently, consumers were transacting with others whom they knew by reputation on financial and
29
credit matters, investment opportunities, or consumer items. Improvements in transportation likely fueled the advancement of be30
ing able to work speedily through the mail.
In an ever-dispersed transactional environment still devoid of
name brands, firms or scammers could take advantage of consumers more readily because “exacerbated inequalities in access to pertinent economic information”would make assessing quality more
31
difficult for retailers. The very development of brands, which was
intended to instill consumer trust and confidence in their transactions with distant players, was also used as a tool by scammers. Balleisen notes that the rise of brands reacted to a need for assessment of quality in the developing national marketplace, where
32
reputation could be harder to assess. Like every conceptual innovation, the rise of brands “spawned new opportunities for misrepresentation and fraud. . . . so as to carry out fraud against econom33
ic neophytes and sophisticates alike.”
Even with modern market evolutions, as a whole, technological
solutions cannot evade the fundamental structure of impostor
fraud, evident since Herman Melville’s time. Melville observed that
information asymmetries in the market afforded a blueprint to
swindlers who realized that in order to pull off a fraud, they “must

26. EDWARD H. SMITH, CONFESSIONS OF A CONFIDENCE MAN 9 (1923); BALLEISEN, supra
note 1, at 23.
27. BALLEISEN, supra note 1, at 23.
28. Id. at 24.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Richard Sears of Sears, Roebuck & Co. tangled with fraud accusations from the Post
Office in 1894. The Post Office refused to deliver return correspondence to Sears as a
means to stop what they had considered to be fraudulent activity. Id. at 3–4. Though misguided in this instance, the Post Office took initiative as an intermediary chokepoint for
fraud, and I later contend that the key to slowing down impostor fraud will be to shift responsibility to the stewards of similar chokepoints.
31. Id. at 24.
32. See id. at 26.
33. Id.
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look the part, possess the right props, [and] know the right cues.”
Melville may have operated in a time where “Spanish prisoner”
scams, discussed below in Section I.B, dominated, but he might
recognize the structure of the robocall operation that mimicked
Microsoft or the IRS. The “Indonesian Hollywood” scam, discussed
in Section I.B, might not have surprised him one bitThe means,
the stories, and the instrumentalities of fraud change, but “social
mimicry” efforts never cease and seemingly never fail to find suc35
cess.
The dramatic advancements and changes in communications
over the past twenty years have been just as transformative as the
nineteenth-century changes in consumer markets. The nineteenth
36
century first brought the telegraph, and later the telephone, and
37
speedier and cheaper mail, all of which facilitated imposture.
Twenty-first-century advancements offer similar opportunities for
the advancement of impostor schemes. The Internet allows people
falsely to claim affiliation with government entities, including law
enforcement and legitimate businesses, and to connect using false
38
personas through dating and social media applications. The now
close-to-zero cost of long-distance telephone calling, a fairly new
39
phenomenon, as well as the ease of money transfer facilitated by
40
the proliferation of new payment devices like gift cards have also
moved imposture forward by a leap.

34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 29.
36. For a comprehensive understanding of the development of communications technology during this period through the early internet, see JOHN BRAY, THE COMMUNICATIONS
MIRACLE: THE TELECOMMUNICATION PIONEERS FROM MORSE TO THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY (1995).
37. See Fred J. Romanski, The Fast Mail: A History of the U.S. Railway Mail Service,
PROLOGUE MAG., Fall 2005, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2005/fall
/fast-mail-1.html [https://perma.cc/WU6V-JJTP] (describing the role of the railways in the
development of postal services).
38. See infra Section I.C.
39. See Freeing Up the Telephone, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/science-and-technology/2015/12/01/freeing-up-the-telephone
[https://perma.cc
/SA9T-DYX6] (attributing the historic and recent drops in cost both to technological innovation and competition, particularly from VoIP).
40. Cyndie Martini, Gift Cards: Everyone’s Favorite Gift, Including Criminals, CPO MAG.
(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/gift-cards-everyones-favoritegift-especially-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/P8NF-Z7PC] (discussing growth of gift cards
and associated fraud).
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B. The Past and Present of Impostor Scams:
New Dogs Learning Old Tricks
Impostor scams have a rich heritage and, in many ways, have re41
tained their original form. They were so established by the late
nineteenth century that contemporaneous news accounts referred
to these scams as resurgences of an already old problem. An 1898
New York Times article described the return of an impostor scam,
42
one that had acquired the name, “the Spanish [P]risoner.” At
that point, the scheme had become regarded as one of the more
successful artifices for swindling people out of their money. “As
it . . . worked in two countries[,] the detection and punishment of
the operators are practically impossible, especially as the victims
43
rarely complain,” and the Times expressed suspicion that local authorities overseas may have been in cahoots with the scammers.44
The crux of the Spanish prisoner scheme will sound similar to
many that we see today, albeit using different communications
mediums and methods of payment. In the Spanish prisoner
scheme, a person in the United States would receive a letter purporting to be sent from a person of seeming prominence claiming
to be a prisoner overseas and explaining that the writer was im45
prisoned for a “political offense.” The “prisoner” would contact
the American mark, claiming that a trusted mutual acquaintance
(who, of course, could not be named for secrecy purposes) had put
the prisoner in contact with the mark in order to receive help in
46
unlocking a hidden fortune. (Today, a simple Google search
might prevent this racket from getting too far, but even that is uncertain.)
The “prisoner” might write that he had a daughter being held
for “board” by a boarding school overseas, but that the prisoner
had a stash of money in the false bottom of a trunk being held in
47
pawn. If the American could send money to a trusted overseas associate to secure the trunk, the money inside the trunk could be
41. Edward Balleisen’s comprehensive tome details the history of fraud in America and
the constant dynamics that have driven—and continue to drive it. See BALLEISEN, supra note
1. However, Balleisen explicitly “steer[s] clear of [discussing] most of the classic swindles
directed at individuals by con artists” to focus on business fraud. Id. at 10. He severs off
“bunco steering” (inducing people to play “rigged game[s] of chance”) and the “many types
of advanced fee scams,” for example. Id. Even though he steers clear of direct discussion,
much of Balleisen’s work applies to the impostor scams, too, as I discuss infra.
42. An Old Swindle Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1898, at 12, https://timesmachine.
nytimes.com/timesmachine/1898/03/20/102108294.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2JA-2MJ9].
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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used to free the daughter, and of course, the American would get
48
to keep a substantial portion of the money for their kind service.
A skilled scammer could find a number of ways to manipulate and
extract more money from a mark, once hooked. Similar “advance
fee” scams have emanated from places like Nigeria using email and
49
social networks, making it apparent that modern scammers may
have updated the scheme, but they certainly did not invent it. Perhaps an old dog cannot be taught new tricks, but new dogs can be
taught old tricks—and modernize and improve them.
Like some of today’s schemes, as the Times reported, the Spanish
prisoner impostor scheme typically operated in two countries, making enforcement difficult. Today’s impostor fraud has accelerated
due to the plunging costs of communication with potential victims
and the continued ease of finding payment mechanisms to facili50
tate the scheme. Apparently, devising a sympathetic story, mixed
with an opportunity to make money, has a fundamental timeless
appeal. Again, even before the turn of the twentieth century, the
Times had reported that the Spanish Prisoner scheme was already
decades old and difficult to address.
It may prove tempting to conceive of impostor fraud as a phenomenon that only preys on the naïve or vulnerable populations
51
like the elderly, but such conclusions are mistaken and serve to
diminish appreciation for the absolute power of impostor fraud.
Impostor schemes, when artfully designed, can hook an array of
sophisticated people motivated by fear or by the same core desire
to leap at opportunities for success.

48. Id.
49. Nigerian Letter or 419 Fraud, Scams and Safety, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/nigerian-letter-or-419-fraud
[https://perma.cc/7MVJ-QWTQ].
50. Old-fashioned letter writing outreach, however, apparently never completely goes
out of style, despite the labor-intensiveness and postage expense. Professor Eric Goldman of
Santa Clara Law School shared a handwritten letter that he recently received that originated
in Uganda. See Letter from “a/k/a likely scammer” to Professor Eric Goldman (July 17,
2018) (on file with author). The letter purported to be from a young, female student who
had been forced to drop out of tailoring school because after her father’s death, she was
unable to continue to afford tuition. The letter seeks Professor Eric Goldman’s charity to
help her complete school, promising nothing in return. My cursory research into her plea
for help revealed that there was a website for the tailoring school and the church that appeared to verify elements of the story, but the contact information on the website did not
mesh with what was in her letter. Although it is possible that this letter writer does exist and
suffers from these circumstances, a recipient would have to take a leap of faith if he were to
send money per the instructions.
51. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13 (showing that fraud as a general category is reported at all age groups, and perhaps more likely to be reported by younger demographics).
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Consider the recent case of the “Indonesia Showbiz” scam,” al53
so known as the case of the “Hollywood Con Queen.” In this impostor fraud iteration, entertainment industry participants had
been targeted by a scammer conducting an elaborate impersonation of prominent female studio executives via telephone, text
messages, or email. The scammer lured the victims to travel to Indonesia at their own expense to follow up on an attractive job offer. A “driver” would meet the target in Indonesia and then fleece
the victims for cash for driving services and other services until the
target realized they were a mark. The scam has taken another turn,
perhaps toward what could also look like a setup of sexual black54
mail. The Hollywood Con Queen scam (or scammers) has
launched impersonations of “nearly two dozen” people and lured
“dozen[s]” of victims, enough to warrant the FBI creating a
55
webpage for victims.
New dogs have indeed learned the old tricks and have occasionally honed them into spectacular acts. As I detail below in my discussion of scams often delivered through robocalling, many of the
common impostor scams reported to federal and state authorities
involve similar elements. They frequently include an overseas
component that shields scammers from law enforcement, and they
cruelly manipulate human hopes for a financial or emotional
windfall or to instill great fear in their targets, all to induce a cash
transfer.
C. Impostor Scams Today
The Spanish prisoner and Indonesia Showbiz scams provide
colorful examples of impostor fraud, but impostor fraud has become a routine today. What is modern impostor fraud and how
does it differ from other categories of fraud? The FTC Consumer
Sentinel describes impostor fraud as where “[s]omeone pretends

52. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau Investigation, Seeking Victims in Indonesia Showbiz
Scam Investigation (July 15, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/resources/victim-services
/seeking-victim-information/seeking-victims-in-indonesia-showbiz-scam-investigation
[https://perma.cc/22KF-3UU5].
53. See Rhodes Murphy, Hollywood’s Mysterious “Con Queen” Is Now Impersonating Marvel
Executives, SLATE (July 15, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://slate.com/culture/2019/07/a-mysteriouscon-artist-is-impersonating-female-marvel-executives-for-elaborate-sham.html
[https://perma.cc/K8K2-NS64].
54. See id.
55. Scott Johnson, FBI Seeks More Victims of Hollywood Con Artist After Marvel Executive Targeted, HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 15, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.
com/news/fbi-seeks-more-victims-hollywood-con-artist-marvel-executive-targeted-1137712
[https://perma.cc/TKE9-JXSD] .
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to be a trusted person to get consumers to send money or give per56
sonal information.” The Sentinel provides examples of such
schemes, where each scheme offers a unique twist on the scourge.
There are schemes where the scammer falsely claims a government
affiliation, like law enforcement and tax authorities, or charities
57
and private companies. Impersonations of the Internal Revenue
Service or of a Microsoft-related entity appear to be common fla58
vors of that variety. Some schemes involve the scammer claiming
to be a known friend or relation in an emergency cash crisis. 59
Other impostors pretend to be a “romantic interest” and extract
60
cash by exploiting that dynamic. Because impostor fraudsters
manufacture authority to manipulate emotions like fear, greed,
and loneliness to motivate people to “transact” with them or otherwise give them money, combating impostor fraud proves somewhat more complex.
Within the category of impostor fraud reports, the Consumer
61
Sentinel breaks them down further. Though dollar losses are a
significant measure, each report reflects some degree of loss to an
individual, which reflects the infliction of a nonpecuniary and
emotional impact, as well. Government impostor scams are the
most heavily reported, accounting for nearly half of all impostor
62
scams. “Tech support” impostor scam reports tripled between
2016 and 2018, becoming the second most commonly reported
63
impostor scam. Business imposture is also on the rise, as the third
64
most common. Though friends and family and romance scams
account for only ten percent of impostor scam reports, friends and
family scam reports have spiked nearly fifty percent since 2016,
65
while reported incidents of romance scams have nearly doubled.
1. Government Impostors
“Government impostors” will use counterfeit authority to fake
their status to appeal, for instance, to the hope of those who think
they may have had the good fortune of winning a lottery, or to the
fear of those who think that they might be arrested, imprisoned, or
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 81.
Id.
See id. at 86.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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sued for leaving an unknown debt, tax liability, or fees unpaid.
Government imposture could involve using the telephone, email,
texting, or other means to inform a victim that they have won a lottery, but in order to collect the big prize, they will have to pay a
67
service charge. The impostor poses as a lottery official, the Federal Trade Commission, or even fictional agencies such as “the national consumer protection agency,” or the “National Sweepstakes
Bureau” as the cover of authority to require the advance payment
68
to receive the big winnings.
Government impostors are also known to use the telephone to
impersonate the Internal Revenue Service, local sheriff’s offices,
and even judges to try to “collect” non-existent debts, threatening
69
the victim with severe consequences for not paying. These
schemes, as noted below, involve wire transfers and “rechargeable
money card[s],” also known as gift cards, as mechanisms for the
70
victim to transfer money to the impostor. Another common variation involves the imposture of the Social Security Administration,
71
also via telephone. The scammer poses as an agent, claiming that
the victim’s social security number has been “blocked” due to suspicious and nefarious activity, like use in a crime or an illegal mon72
ey transfer. There might be a false reactivation fee involved or an
instruction to remove money out of a bank account to prevent au73
thorities from seizing it. The scammer may also threaten the consequence of discontinuation of Social Security benefits, which for
74
many are a complete financial lifeline. Imposture of a government official in these contexts often exploits the low-cost mechanism of the telephone to reach a range of vulnerable people and a
set of common mechanisms to facilitate an irreversible money
transfer.

66. Government Imposter Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/
articles/0048-government-imposter-scams [https://perma.cc/S8TA-CE99].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Jennifer Leach, Fake Calls About Your SSN, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/12/fake-calls-about-your-ssn [https://perma.cc/
3Q5J-SDAM].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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2. Tech-support Impostors
Tech support scams often lure victims through outbound telephone calls and fabricated pop-up warnings on websites, where victims are told that their computer has a virus or malware that they
75
must fix with some urgency. Tech support scammers also use
search-word driven web advertisements (driven off keywords
76
around tech support) and in search engine results. Their goal is
to convince people to pay for technical assistance that they do not
need and to solve non-existent technical problems with their com77
puters. These scammers impersonate employees at tech companies, often identifying themselves as associated with Microsoft or
78
related entities. According to the FTC, the preferred payment
methods for these scammers include “wiring money, putting money on a gift card, prepaid card or cash reload card, or using a
money transfer app because they know those types of payments can
79
be hard to reverse.”
3. Friends and Family Impostors
Though not the highest in volume, perhaps the cruelest and
most calculating of scams involves the imposture of family or
friends in distress or long cons where the impostor poses as a longdistance romantic partner to steal money from a victim seeking
companionship. One example of this type of scam is known as the
“grandparent scam.” As the AARP warns members:
This is how the grandparent scam typically plays out: You
get a call from someone pretending to be your grandchild.
The person explains that he is in trouble, with a story that
goes something like this: “There’s been an accident and
I’m______ (in jail, in the hospital, stuck in a foreign country), and I need your help.” The caller adds enough details
about how, what or where the emergency happened to
make the story seem plausible. And the distraught caller,

75. How to Spot, Avoid, and Report Tech Support Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-spot-avoid-and-report-tech-support-scams
[https://perma.cc/CPZ6-92M5].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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you think to yourself, does sort of sound like your grandson
80
or granddaughter.
The social engineering escalates if the victim hooks into this story. Under some executions of this scam, the initial caller next directs the target to call another person who will impersonate an authority figure like a physician, an attorney, or a law enforcement
81
official, who will offer more of a story. The use of an inbound telephone number and authority enables the impostor to carry the
deceit further because, as one FTC lawyer put it, “[t]his makes it
82
seem more real when you call and talk to the authority.” Of
course, the way out of the jam offered to the grandparent to rescue
their grandchild is to send or wire money immediately—with a
83
message relayed: “Don’t tell Mom and Dad!” Sometimes, the vic84
tims will even desperately send cash to the scammers. The
“grandparent” victim may be led to believe that their relative needs
payment to a hospital for urgent treatment, or to an authority like
a lawyer or law enforcement official to keep their impostored
85
grandchild out of jail.
Unlike the other scams, which seem to strike broadly, using massive low-cost telephone outreach operations, scams involving impersonation of family, friends, and romantic interests may require
the scammer to invest more in cultivating and grooming individual
targets. Some of the victims can indeed be hooked at random because “these scammers are experts at impersonating people they’ve
never even met . . . . [T]hey may simply wait for their target to use
a name–‘Steve, is that you?’ “ and take the impersonation from
86
there. Some scammers buy lists of people who have been easy
marks before or older people who might fall prey to this type of
87
operation. Others use information that may be available from social media sites, where people put their families on open display
with information about names, relationships, and locations for
scammers to exploit the dynamics with a high degree of credibil88
ity. When scammers add urgency and safety of a loved one to this

80. Stacy Colino, Beware of Grandparent Scam, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/money/
scams-fraud/info-2018/grandparent-scam-scenarios.html [https://perma.cc/VZL9-MBCV].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Emma Fletcher, New Twist to Grandparent Scam: Mail Cash, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/data-spotlight/2018/12/new-twistgrandparent-scam-mail-cash [https://perma.cc/N2KK-D2SF].
85. Colino, supra note 80.
86. Fletcher, supra note 84.
87. Colino, supra note 80.
88. Fletcher, supra note 84.
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dynamic, “critical thinking faculties are just not the way they are
89
normally.” To the scammer who might be operating on a portfolio of marks, the only cost to losing control of such a scheme is the
opportunity cost, but the emotional and financial costs to the mark
are substantial.
The payment schemes for this scam are typical of the others, including wiring money and the use of gift cards. This particular
scam, however, may be evolving toward cash payment, delivered
90
through the mail or overnight services. Perhaps cash has proven
to be an easier mechanism for extracting money because the older
segments of the population might not have access or as much familiarity with newer payments systems or might not have the ease
of leaving home. Some victims have been instructed to do quite
specific things with the cash, like “divid[ing] the bills into envelopes and plac[ing] them between the pages of a magazine” before
91
sending out the payment, perhaps, one speculates, for scammers
to avoid detection if the cash was being shipped overseas. Scamming people out of cash currency may prove to be the most difficult system for policymakers and institutions to fix, so extra enforcement vigilance may be required here.
4. Romance Impostor Scams
Romance scams are yet another impostor scam, except that instead of using the cover of authority, the scammer assumes a false
identity and cultivates a relationship with their mark, often online.
This is a modern-day version of in-person scams where the scammer would invest heavily and at greater risk to swindle and deceive
people face-to-face, in what Jill Hasday has extensively documented
92
as “an abundance of intimate deception.” This recent version,
largely executed through online dating, involves less in-person risk
of detection and permits the scammers to access and work on
more victims simultaneously. Of note, online dating has become a
leading avenue for how couples meet in the United States, so, of
93
course, enterprising impostors will follow along for the ride.
89. Colino, supra note 80.
90. Fletcher, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW 6 (2019). Hasday documents a
number of contexts for financial fraud among intimates who know each other in person. Id.
at 16.
93. See generally MICHAEL J. ROSENFELD, REUBEN J. THOMAS & SONIA HAUSEN,
DISINTERMEDIATING YOUR FRIENDS: HOW ONLINE DATING IN THE UNITED STATES DISPLACES
OTHER WAYS OF MEETING (2019), https://www.pnas.org/content/116/36/17753/tabfigures-data [https://perma.cc/56PR-SNWX].
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The FTC recently warned the public about this scam on Valen94
tine’s Day, of course. “What do we mean by romance scams?
We’re not talking about the person you thought was ‘the one’ but
ended up being a dud. We’re talking about people you meet
online, who lavish you with attention . . . and then ask for mon95
ey.” The scammers source their targets from social media and dating sites and go to work from there, using fake profiles or misap96
propriating the identity of a real person. Again, the scammers
seek their “gifts” by wire transfer or, appropriately enough, via gift
cards. 97 The pretext for needing the money might be an emergency or for a trip to meet up, the former of which is contrived, the
98
latter never to happen. The ability to scale this scam is more challenging for the swindler than blast robocalling and the time investment in each target is larger. The potential return from this
type of scam, however, is apparently higher than the other opera99
100
tions. The median reported loss on all impostor scams is $500,
while the median loss from romance scams was $2,600, over five
101
times as much.
On the whole, two themes run throughout the recent rise of the
common impostor scams. First, communication technologies and
platforms have made the process of imposture less risky and less
expensive than ever before. Second, payment system innovations,
particularly the rise of pre-paid gift cards, which can function as
cash, have also facilitated the ability of impostors to receive payment. The core structure of the scams, which use fear, greed, and
in some cases, loneliness, remain the same as they did in the Spanish
prisoner era, but the ability to seek potential targets and complete
their victimization has become much easier, less costly, and less
risky, which explains their rise.
II. IMPOSTOR SCAM ECONOMICS
Like any other economic activity, if the costs and risks of engaging in scams drop and the returns from scams grow or even hold
steady, more scams will likely surface. Incentives will drive decision
94. Lisa Weintraub Schifferle, Romance Scams Will Cost You, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb.
12,
2019),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/02/romance-scams-will-cost-you
[https://perma.cc/B69Y-29TB].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 8.
101. Schifferle, supra note 94.
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making. In the analog era, the “classic” impostor scam often required the scammer to have a physical presence, which created
both risk of detection and punishment and required more time investment. In the modern era, the economics of scamming improved as developments in communications and payment systems
enabled scammers to scale up their activities inexpensively. This
lowers costs and expands the reach of scammers, while increasing
their distance from their victims and, thus, lowering their risk of
directly confronting enforcement. The economics explain why impostor scams have proliferated and prove critical to understanding
how to slow them down. I discuss next how the economics and use
of technology evolved over the past several decades.
A. Economics of “Classic” Impostor Scams
The economics of a pre-modern impostor scam emerges crisply
and colorfully from the facts of a 1957 New Jersey agency law case
that has become a favorite of a generation of Business Associations’
102
103
instructors and students, Hoddeson v. Koos Bros. This case typifies the architecture of an impostor scam, and the common law
provided a solution—pushing the cost onto the intermediary for
negligently allowing the scammer to use their instrumentality and
104
legitimacy to pull off the scam. The impostor scam that befell the
shopper, Mrs. Hoddeson, at a retail furniture store, Koos Bros., in
Rahway, New Jersey serves as an ancestor, perhaps, to the techsupport scam, where the scammer purports to work for a company,
but does not. The physical store serves as much as an instrumentality and venue for the transfer of payment as modern payment systems do in other scams.
Before presenting the facts, the judge observed that impostor
scams were nothing new, but always evolving: “The occurrence
which engages our present attention is a little more than conventionally unconventional in the common course of trade. . . . A digest of the story told by Mrs. Hoddeson will be informative and
105
perhaps admonitory to the unwary shopper.”
On a previous visit to Koos Bros., Hoddeson had scouted out
106
some pieces of bedroom furniture on display. As the court observed, “it has been said that ‘the sea hath bounds but deep desire
102. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS 29–32 (10th ed. 2018).
103. 135 A.2d 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 703.
106. Id.
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hath none’ ” and Hoddeson had received a $165 gift from her
107
mother to indulge her desire to buy the furniture. Hoddeson
took this gift money, and one morning, brought her aunt and four
108
children to the store to make the furniture purchase. Instead of
meeting with a salesperson, they encountered an ingenious impostor carrying all sorts of airs of authority and the aura of belonging
109
to the store.
The court recounted that “[u]pon entering, she was greeted by
a tall man with dark hair frosted at the temples and clad in a light
110
gray suit.” The tall man “inquired if he could be of assistance”
and led Hoddeson and her “flock” to the display of the furniture
111
that Hoddeson wanted. Next, he wrote down a calculation of the
purchase price, $168.50, after which Hoddeson gave him cash, for
112
which she did not ask for a receipt. This entire exchange took
113
place over thirty to forty minutes. The tall man informed her that
the furniture she had selected and purchased was not in stock and
114
would be delivered to her the following month. Unfortunately
for Hoddeson, the furniture would never arrive and the store
115
claimed to have no record of the sale.
In the aftermath, the store owners held fast to their assertion
that the sale had been made by an impostor and not by one of
116
their salesmen. In fact, the store paraded the salesmen in that
department past Hoddeson and her aunt, in something like a po117
lice lineup, offering the “opportunity to gaze intently” at them.
They were unable to definitively identify any of them as the aforementioned “tall man” who took the money—and the one who
came closest to suspicion had supposedly been on vacation during
118
Hoddeson’s visit. All in all, however, the jury found that Hoddeson “established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that
the $168.50 was paid in fact to an employee of the defendant,” and
the trial judge concluded that the evidence warranted such a find119
ing.
107. Id. Though the court appears to set Hoddeson on a course where she could be
made whole, the tone of the opinion could be characterized as disrespectful to the scam
victim.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 703–04.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 704.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 704–05.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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On appeal, Koos Bros. argued that “there was a deficit of evidence to support the conclusion that a relationship of master and
servant existed between the man who served and received the
120
money from Mrs. Hoddeson and the defendant company.” The
court agreed with Koos Bros., finding that the plaintiffs had failed
to allege and prove the existence of an agency relationship be121
tween the “tall man” and the store. Therefore, Hoddeson failed
to allege that the “tall man” had express, implied, or actual authority to establish privity of contract. The appellate court reversed the
122
trial court on this point. “Assuredly, the law cannot permit apparent authority to be established by the mere proof that a moun123
tebank [or ‘humbugger’] in fact exercised it.”
For Hoddeson, however, all was not lost. Though the court reversed on the grounds prosecuted in assumpsit by the plaintiff, the
court “recommended . . . the allowance of a new trial with the privilege accorded the plaintiff to reconstruct the architecture of [the]
124
complaint” in order to plead “agency by estoppel” or “tortious
125
dereliction of duty owed to an invited customer.” The court hypothesized that if the facts were as alleged, “would the defendant
be immune as a matter of law from liability for the plaintiffs’
126
loss?” The court answered with an approach that warrants some
modern extension:
The tincture of estoppel that gives color to instances of apparent authority might in the law operate likewise to preclude a defendant’s denial of liability. . . . [W]e have in
mind . . . the unique occurrences where solely through the
lack of the proprietor’s reasonable surveillance and supervision an impostor falsely impersonates in the place of
127
business an agent or servant of his.
The court noted that a proprietor’s duties to customers “certainly . . . encompass more than the diligent observance and removal
128
of banana peels from the aisles.” Further, the court articulated a
rationale for shifting the costs of deception from the consumer to
the department store. “The rule that those who bargain without

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 705.
Id. at 705–06 .
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 707.
See id. at 706–07.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 706–07.
Id.
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inquiry with an apparent agent do so at the risk and peril of an absence of the agent’s authority has a patently impracticable application to the customers who patronize our modern department
129
stores.” The court confronted the new landscape of the modern
department store, recognized the possibility of newfound impostor
scams, and put the burden on the department stores to absorb
losses—thus, putting the incentives for mitigating this fraud into
the laps of these stores.
Just as we note that new technologies and new consumption and
payment mechanisms enable impostors today, in 1957 this court
noted that “modern department stores,” presumably with their
broad layouts, presented new challenges for consumers, who could
be taken in by a “mountebank” roaming the floor in search of vul130
nerable customers. Indeed, the Hoddeson court observed that
131
“old questions appear in new styles.” This case noted that such
impostor occurrences had not been commonly reported in decisions in the early half of the twentieth century, but had occurred
nonetheless. Among them: impostors posing as hotel, railroad, and
parking lot personnel, purporting to have the authority to hold
132
guest, passenger, and automobile property for safekeeping.
In these cases, the courts held accountable the entities whose
personnel were impersonated for making the defrauded property
owner whole. Given a choice between victims, the courts in essence
lay the responsibility for exercising care at the feet of those who
failed to exercise due care. The Hoddeson court left open the possibility that the plaintiff herself could have been at fault, though on
the known facts, that result would seem unlikely.
A few things about this previous generation of impostor tactics
repeat with the problems of impostors today. First, these particular
impostors had to operate in close quarters to the victims, of which
there were two: the victim losing the money and the entity suffering from being impersonated. Certainly both Hoddeson and Koos
Bros. were displeased with how events unfolded that day. Hoddeson lost money and Koos Bros lost a sale to the same thief. So, who
should bear the loss?
Data collected in the FTC Consumer Sentinel inform us that we
may have turned the corner into a different landscape that requires more emphasis on shifting the prevention burdens onto
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 703.
132. See Kanelles v. Locke, 12 Ohio App. 210 (Ohio Ct. App. 1919) (impersonating a
hotel clerk); Miltenberger v. Hulett, 175 S.W. 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) (impersonating railroad transfer agent); Luken v. Buckeye Parking Corp., 68 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945)
(impersonating parking lot attendant).
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those who are in a better position to mitigate impostor damage.
The technology and payment mechanisms that have enabled impostors to increase their scale, and lower the costs and risks of operation, are ultimately controlled by identifiable lower-cost avoiders. For example, telecommunications providers have benefitted
from technology that has lowered the costs of international outbound calling, and this has unwittingly, perhaps, enabled fraud.
Popular payment mechanisms like gift cards have yielded benefits
to retailers but have also presented impostors and scammers with a
clean mechanism for stealing money from consumers. The means
and locations for risky transactions have shifted, thus measures to
address impostor fraud must shift.
B. The Economics of “Modern” Impostor Scams
Classic impostor scams operated successfully in a world where
reaching victims at scale was expensive and often riskier. Technology and the overall improved economics of imposture have recently driven an acceleration of the problem. But this “technology as
accelerant” dynamic is nothing new.
It did not take long for the criminally enterprising to figure out
that a new invention called the telephone provided an opportunity
to defraud people. The Patent Office attributes the 1876 telephone
133
invention to Alexander Graham Bell. By 1878, the first telephone
switching network had been deployed as a Bell franchise in Connecticut, with the publication of the first phone directory also fol134
lowing that year. As a Chicago police inspector observed in 1888,
after pondering the aftermath of an early telephone scam, “The
educated criminal skims the cream from every new invention, if he
135
can make use of it.” The telephone was apparently no exception,
and reports of telephone impostor fraud arrived almost within a
decade of the invention.
Though the means and methods involved physically commandeering a phone, the elements of a modern “grandparent”-type

133. See Who Is Credited With Inventing the Telephone?, LIBR. OF CONG. (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/item/who-is-credited-with-inventing-thetelephone/ [https://perma.cc/9MZ6-6BMP].
134. Kat Eschner, The First Telephone Book Had Fifty Listings and No Numbers, SMITHSONIAN
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/first-telephone-book-hadfifty-listings-and-no-numbers-180962173/ [https://perma.cc/Q9NW-4A79].
135. See Simon van Zuylen-Wood, How Robo-call Moguls Outwitted the Government and Completely Wrecked the Do Not Call List, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/how-robo-call-moguls-outwitted-the-governmentand-completely-wrecked-the-do-not-call-list/2018/01/09/52c769b6-df7a-11e7-bbd09dfb2e37492a_story.html [https://perma.cc/83YY-FNUY].
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hostage scam are all present in an 1888 account offered in the Elec136
trical Review. One weekday, a “smartly dressed” charlatan, who
perhaps could be regarded as the Alexander Graham Bell of telephone impostor fraud, knocked on the door of a prominent, wellto-do trader. 137 Introducing himself as “Thomas Jefferson Odell,”
138
he asked the butler if he could use “the house phone.” Somehow, “Thomas Jefferson Odell” managed to rouse the trader on
the phone at his place of business to inform him falsely that he had
139
bound and gagged the cook, the chambermaid, and his wife.
“Odell” demanded a ransom of $20,000 in cash, which the trader
promptly sent to an accomplice in the scheme. Of course, the
trader “rushed home to find his wife in fine shape and none the
140
wiser.”
The telephone-based impostor scam had arrived. The telephone
offered a means to rapidly deliver a high-pressure, time-sensitive
scam—with much of the concealment of any Spanish prisoner letter scheme. Of course, the Thomas Jefferson Odell gambit demanded more risk and cost to the perpetrators, requiring at least
two personal physical appearances to create the imposture. The
target had to be carefully selected, and the execution had to be
perfect, because the entire imposture, including the cash transfer,
was happening right in Chicago, not originating from a distant
country. As a scamming device for impostors, however, the exploitation of the telephone would take some time—and additional
technology—to reach a greater scale. In the time of Thomas Jefferson Odell, not many people had phones, so accessing a phone by
deceit would be accordingly difficult. As access to telephones increased, and as calling became less expensive, the form of imposture, as well as the method, changed. As payment transfer could be
done from a distance, making the handoff less risky, imposture
changed, too.
What happens when scammers take the power of the impostor
and deploy wider-reaching, lower-cost technology that also enables
them to remain at a distance? Robocalling has proven to be a prolific means for spreading impostor scams. By one account, robocalls “have been around since at least the 1980s, when someone
141
first thought to attach a tape deck to a phone.” A classic scene in

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Alex W. Palmer, On the Trail of the Robocall King, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/on-the-trail-of-the-robocall-king/ [https://perma.cc/A96ZEULK].
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the 1983 movie WarGames revealed the way an enterprising teenage hacker could program his home computer to dial every phone
142
number with a certain prefix until a modem answered. But delivering a message to recipients was more complicated in that analog
time because “the hardware was clunky, expensive, and difficult to
143
operate.” Audio cassettes, which carried and delivered the outbound messages, required rewinding after use and suffered from
144
wear and tear. Of course, this all changed with the arrival of digital technology, which made robocalling substantially less expensive
and easier to implement. 145
The bombardment of preprogrammed unsolicited telephone
calls, in an era before Caller Identification (Caller ID) and when
people regularly answered their phones, led to a collective social
146
outcry. Congress answered these complaints with a flurry of legislation. Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings deemed robocalls “the
scourge of modern civilization,” and apparently Americans concurred with the sentiment, “despite the competing scourges of
147
war . . . or the spread of AIDS.” Senator Hollings, who cosponsored the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of
148
1991, lamented that these calls “wake us up in the morning, they
interrupt our dinner at night, they force the sick and elderly out of
bed, they hound us until we want to rip the telephone right out of
149
the wall.” Bear in mind, Senator Hollings was ranting about robocalls long before scammers began to weaponize them by using
the instrument of the robocall to defraud people out of their money and, in some cases, jeopardize public safety by overwhelming
150
telecommunications systems. As discussed later, much of the
same sort of activity would eventually shift into email systems as
that communications mechanism matured.
Scammers have uncovered the ability to mesh digital technology
with automated telephone calling, enabling them to conduct scams
on a massive scale at a low expense. Thus, impostor scams are cost142. See WARGAMES (United Artists 1983).
143. Palmer, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Intruder on the Phone: Ending a Sales Talk Before It Begins, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/03/style/consumer-s-worldintruder-on-the-phone-ending-a-sales-talk-before-it-begins.html
[https://perma.cc/5KZWGJ3U] (as one telemarketing call recipient put it, telemarketing callers “are very considerate, . . . [t]hey only call during the dinner hour when I am there”).
147. Palmer, supra note 141.
148. Pub. L. No. 102-243 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
149. 137 CONG. REC. 30821 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
150. The FCC first became aware of the Adrian Abramovich robocalling scheme, discussed infra Section III.B, when a hospital network reported major disruptions of its paging
system from floods of inbound phone calls.
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effective scams. Although policymakers and private entities cannot
eliminate them, the ability to make impostor scams more expensive and less effective could reduce their incidence. And a significant portion of the ability to slow down and obstruct scammers
must rest in the hands of private players, who ultimately control
the means of communication and payment, either on their own
accord to compete for customers or at the behest of lawmakers and
regulators seeking to protect the public. Every solution and obstruction, of course, could be circumvented. But keeping private
actors that often provide the tools that enable impostors, albeit unintentionally, at the forefront of prevention can help.
Telecommunications providers offer low-cost tools for impostors
to reach an expansive field of targets, and with more reachable
targets, more infliction of harm from fraud is inevitable. Perhaps
regulators can require or encourage the providers of intermediary
devices to take more responsibility for educating the public and
their users about impostor fraud by offering more security and
providing more disclosures.
III. FIGHTING IMPOSTOR SCAMS
Industry, lawmakers, and regulators have not sat on their hands
while impostor fraud has grown. They have taken recent action to
slow the roll of impostors, but the road ahead appears to be fairly
bleak, even with measures and enforcement action already taken.
Robocalling has been at the core of this scourge and addressing
telephone scams has been a decades-long effort that continues to
face new challenges. As noted, telephones are not the only mechanisms for scammers to communicate with their victims, so even
solving this problem only solves part of the problem.
How difficult is the robocall problem to solve? According to the
CEO of YouMail, Alex Quilici, the telephone scam has taken the
miracle of low-cost long-distance calling to realize a nightmarish
promise of AT&T’s old advertising jingle that anyone can “reach
151
out and touch someone.” YouMail provides robocaller blocking
152
services. Quilici observes that “a 16-person call center in India
can make $75,000 per day” and these call centers span the globe—
”from Florida to Guatemala to Nigeria to New Delhi to Philadelph151. See Linda Robertson, Block those Robocalls from Scammers and Unwanted Companies.
Here’s How to Fight Back, MIA. HERALD (June 15, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/community/miami-dade/article231323738.html; see also AT&T, AT&T Reach
Out and Touch Someone Commercial - 1987, YOUTUBE (Mar. 13, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OapWdclVqEY [https://perma.cc/6JCN-TKRS].
152. Robertson, supra note 151.
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153

ia.” All it takes to get a robocall operation rolling is to “get four
friends together in your apartment with a laptop and make millions of calls for nothing. There’s not a lot of overhead. Collect an
average of $1 per robocall and your profit scales up pretty quick154
ly.”
Robocallers will often use inexpensive and easily accessible telecommunications systems not just to reach people directly but also
to exploit features like Caller ID to facilitate imposture. Scammers
can operate from Guatemala, Nigeria, or Delhi and impersonate
anyone. In other words, robocallers can make it appear that they
are calling from a legitimate business, government agency, or a
155
nearby location.
In Section III.A, I discuss at length the efforts to promulgate a
regulatory solution through the telecommunications sector and in
Section III.B, I describe some of the more aggressive enforcement
actions taken against these fraudsters. As I observe in Section III.C,
many involved in these efforts share pessimism about ultimately
stopping impostor fraud, which is unsurprising given the capability
of scammers to innovate. The policy goal, however, should be oriented to make imposture less lucrative and as costly and risky as
reasonably possible.
A. Telecommunications Regulation
The legislative and regulatory efforts to combat impostor fraud
have focused on mitigation of the broader robocalling issue but
have found limited success. These efforts have further focused on
attempts to address the marriage of robocalling with manipulation
of Caller ID information (also known as number “spoofing”). As
scammers have moved on from using traditional telephone carriers, the technological focus has shifted to this problem. Ultimately,
if these problems are to be addressed, regulators and industry must
collaborate proactively to stay ahead of scammers.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recognized the trouble resulting from Caller ID spoofing which tricks
call recipients into thinking scammers and other callers are someone who they are not. 156 The FCC warns that “spoofing is often
used as part of an attempt to trick someone into giving away valua-

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Caller ID Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/
guides/spoofing-and-caller-id [https://perma.cc/9BVN-97EV].
156. Id.
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ble personal information so it can be used in fraudulent activi157
ty . . . .” The FTC has warned that “scammers are using fake caller
ID information to trick you into thinking they are someone local,
someone you trust – like a government agency or police department, or a company you do business with . . . . One scammer re158
cently used the phone number of an FTC employee.”
FCC Chairman Ajit Pai “has made combatting unlawful robocalls
and malicious caller ID spoofing his top consumer protection pri159
160
ority,” labeling them a “scourge.” In February 2019, the FCC
161
released a report on robocalls and caller ID spoofing. The FCC
noted that it has only recently begun to find effective means “to
stem the tide” of robocalling by intervening with technology and
changes in systems and promoting “aggressive enforcement ac162
tion.”
Starting in 2017, the FCC focused directly on the problem, prioritizing putting a halt to “unwanted calls before they even reach
163
consumers’ phones.” To begin to achieve these ends, the FCC
“enabled voice service providers to block certain obviously-spoofed
calls, authorized the creation of a reassigned numbers database so
consumers do not get calls intended for others, and pushed the
industry to implement Caller ID authentication, a key to stopping
164
spoofing.”
165
As the FCC notes, however, not all robocalls are illegal. The
task for policymakers is to prevent abuse of the telecommunications infrastructure, through illegal robocalls, to further curb impostor scams, while preserving avenues for legitimate automated
calling. Several laws and rules prohibit the misuse of robocalling
166
and Caller ID, but the effectiveness of their enforcement stands

157. Id.
158. Andrew Johnson, Scammers Can Fake Caller ID Info, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May
4, 2016), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2016/05/scammers-can-fake-caller-id-info
[https://perma.cc/TUJ7-UXU6].
159. The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls & Spoofing, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-initiatives/fccs-push-combat-robocalls-spoofing [https://
perma.cc/68Q5-HUDU].
160. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CG DOCKET NO. 17-59, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS 15 (2019),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95RHVGYR].
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at 2.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. The FCC elaborates, “Consumers frequently associate “robocalls” with annoying
calls and, indeed, unwanted calls are a perennial top consumer complaint. . . . And yet the
term “robocall” covers a wide array of calls, many of which are legal, such as school closing
announcements and prescription or medical appointment reminders.” Id.
166. See id. at 2–3.
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at odds with the recent growth of impostor scams that rely on robocalling, like tech scams.
167
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and associ168
ated Delivery Restrictions rules serve to prohibit:
[initiation of] any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called
party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes, is
made solely pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or
169
guaranteed by the United States . . . .
Many of the impostor scams use prerecorded voices to impersonate authorities in order either to generate a return call or to
draw the recipient to enter a phone tree leading them to an impostor. The use of such mechanisms by impostors flagrantly violates
170
this section of the TCPA and the accompanying FCC rules.
Similarly, scammers, particularly overseas scammers, appear undeterred by laws and rules serving similar protective purposes, like
171
the Do Not Call Implementation Act, the Telemarketing Con172
sumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, and the Telemarketing
173
Sales Rule. Those laws require telemarketers (although presumably it only affects the telemarketers that care about compliance)
to check the National Do Not Call Registry before dialing numbers
and generally prohibit deceptive practices through telemarket174
ing. Like the TCPA, these laws were intended to rein in the nuisance and deceptive marketing abuses of those who solicit business
through the telephone, but they primarily serve to reach violators
175
within the realm and reach of domestic enforcement. Domestically, the fines and penalties for violating these laws and regulations can be severe when directed against those within reach of enforcement. For example, the FTC sought to collect $280 million
from DISH Network and its agents for “committing more than 65
176
million violations of telemarketing statutes and regulations.”

167. 47 U.S.C. § 227.
168. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2020).
169. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
170. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1) (2020) (prohibiting the initiation of “an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” without consent).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 6101.
172. Id. §§ 6101–6108.
173. 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2020).
174. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3.
175. See id. at 2–3.
176. United States v. DISH Network, LLC, 954 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. dismissed, 141 S.Ct. 729 (2021) (mem.).
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When directed against the overseas operation that operates an impostor scheme on a massive scale, however, these laws and regulations have no teeth.
177
The 2009 Truth in Caller ID Act (TCIDA) offers a direct tool
178
for combating telephone harassment and imposture scam tactics.
This tool only has teeth if policymakers direct resources toward enforcement, including overseas efforts to combat call spoofing.
TCIDA “prohibits . . . provision of inaccurate caller identification
179
information.” Specifically, it declares unlawful the practice of
“causing any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of val180
ue.”
Presumably, this broad language incorporates prohibition of the
abuse of newer technologies that have proliferated, like IP-enabled
181
voice service. Many impostors use services like Skype to hide and
182
spoof their identities. But again, like the other federal statutes
and rules, TCIDA only serves a purpose if enforced.
The FCC has since moved beyond the enforcement of these
statutes to look for other solutions to prevent or slow down the use
of telecommunications systems as tools for impostor scams. As the
report summarized, “the same characteristics that make robocalls
183
appealing to businesses also make them appealing to scammers.”
Robocalling “efficiently and cost-effectively” enables scammers and
184
impostors to pull off their fraud. The FCC is well aware that impostor scammers “may not be deterred by the prospect of en185
forcement and may be especially difficult to locate.” As a result,
the FCC “has focused on stopping illegal robocalls before they
186
reach consumers’ phones.”
The public may be fooled by impostor scammers because when
called, they “may not have enough information to tell whether the
187
call is wanted, unwanted, or illegal.” If they have Caller ID, the
188
display may show a “spoofed” or a blocked number. The recipi177. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
178. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e).
180. Id. § 227(e)(1).
181. Id.
182. Samantha Murphy Kelley, The Frightening Future of Robocalls: Numbers and Voices You
Know, CNN BUS. (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/06/tech/robocalls-scamvoice/index.html [https://perma.cc/UA8M-MK7T].
183. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 3.
184. Id. at 3–4.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
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ent of the call, if interested in figuring out who is trying to reach
189
them, must answer the call or let the caller leave a voicemail.
Mitigating abusive spoofing of Caller ID calls for more than a
statutory solution, and the FCC has taken note of collaboration be190
tween government and industry to stop the problem. The FCC
has moved forward on several different fronts, which I will describe
next, but still faces significant challenges in addressing impostor
191
fraud, even with success on these fronts.
The FCC has moved to expand the circumstances where voice
service providers can engage in call blocking. The solution provided by this expansion, however, proves somewhat easy for the determined impostor scammer to evade. In November 2017, the FCC
192
“authorized providers to block Do Not Originate (DNO) calls”
and calls originating from “invalid, unallocated, or unused” num193
bers. Service providers were able to block the spoofing of actual
IRS phone numbers, which led to a dramatic reduction in scam
194
complaints to the IRS. Ultimately, this provides an example of
how impostor scammers can be slowed down by a move but not
stopped. Impersonation of IRS personnel does not require a number associated with the IRS, though it certainly made the process
easier for the scammers by lending credibility.
According to the FCC, voice service providers report “widespread implementation of DNO blocking, and several . . . have implemented or are implementing blocking of invalid, unallocated,
195
and unused numbers.” The FCC, at long last in December 2018,
adopted a rule to clarify that the wireless carriers could also take
specific measures to block “robotexts” and other unwanted messag196
ing.
The FCC also took note of the wave of private innovation that
197
enables users to employ apps and other means of call blocking,
observing that “[h]undreds of call-blocking apps have been devel198
oped for mobile telephones.” Some services block all calls that

189. Id.
190. Id. at 7.
191. See id. at 6–14.
192. Id. at 7 n.37 (“Do Not Originate calls are calls made from a number that the subscriber does not use to make outgoing calls and requests that calls purporting to originate
from that number be blocked.”).
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 7 n.38. For a description of the immediate impact of this initiative, see FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, ROBOCALL STRIKE FORCE REPORT 1 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov
/cgb/Robocall-Strike-Force-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX4J-NHQD].
195. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 7.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Id.
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use Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, a favorite of
200
scammers. For landline consumers, blocking services are offered
by some carriers for a fee and by others for free. Consumers Union, the National Consumer Law Center, and the Consumer Federation of America have advocated that such services and tools
201
should all be offered by providers for free. If voluntarily adopted,
however, these tools will most likely be adopted by those already
wise to the impostor scams. The adopters may be looking to stamp
out the nuisance of these calls, but, as noted, there are other
means by which scammers can defeat these safeguards.
In addition to their engagement on call blocking, voice service
providers, with a bit of a push from the FCC, have made advance202
ments on Caller ID authentication. This technology could put
another technological obstacle in front of impostor scammers. As
the FCC notes, “[t]he benefits of authentication are substantial:
consumers and voice service providers will know that callers are
who they say they are, thereby reducing the risk of fraud and en203
suring that callers can be held accountable for their calls.” Authentication could obstruct such pernicious practices as “neighbor
spoofing,” which supposedly induces people to answer calls when a
scammer spoofs a number that looks local, by using the same area
204
code or prefix.
A variety of private task forces and alliances have converged to
develop a system that uses Caller ID authentication to stop impostor calls from reaching the caller by “confirming that a call actually
205
comes from the number displayed in the Caller ID.” It turns out
a technological solution that uses a “framework of interconnected
standards” may exist that might put a speed bump into scamming
206
operations Appropriately, given the difficulty of weeding out
these scammers, the framework has drawn upon the James Bond
207
movie franchise for a name worthy of the role, “SHAKEN/STIR.”

199. Id.
200. Catey Hill, Don’t Pick Up! This Is the No. 1 Time Scammers Are Calling You,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 18, 2018, 09:00 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/dont-pickup-this-is-the-no-1-time-scammers-are-calling-you-2017-11-22
[https://perma.cc/ZC3VA4HF] (Spamming technology “is cheap and easy to make thanks to Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP), which lets scammers make billions of automated calls”).
201. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 8 n.43.
202. See id. at 8–10.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Combating Spoofed Robocalls with Caller ID Authentication, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/call-authentication [https://perma.cc/E7F5-F2NW].
207. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 9. Fictional spy hero James Bond always
orders his martinis shaken, not stirred. Karen Kaplan, Docs Explain Why James Bond Prefers His
Martinis ‘Shaken, not Stirred,’ L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.latimes.com
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“SHAKEN” stands for Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs and “STIR” refers to the Secure Tele208
phone Identity Revisited standards.
The approach, though not as deadly as a James Bond device,
strengthens security protocols to enhance the likelihood that only
209
identified phone numbers reach recipients. In essence, the protocol would only let calls through that meet the criteria for an electronic handshake. “Calls traveling through interconnected phone
networks would have their Caller ID ‘signed’ as legitimate by originating carriers and validated by other carriers before reaching” re210
cipients. In other words, the SHAKEN/STIR framework “digitally
validates the handoff of phone calls passing through the complex
web of networks, allowing the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is in fact from the number dis211
played on Caller ID.”
According to the FCC, “SHAKEN/STIR does not authenticate
212
the content of the call, only the identity of the caller.” By “identity of the caller,” the FCC means the identity of the originating line.
Presumably, a person could pick up a phone and make a call and
pretend to be someone whom they are not and initiate a scam.
Nonetheless, full implementation of SHAKEN/STIR would not only eliminate the nuisance of unlawful robocalls, but it would also
create a significant hurdle for impostor scammers. The FCC set a
goal to implement this system in 2019, relying on the cooperation
213
of private industry groups and service providers. But rulemaking
214
advanced through 2020. With the adoption of SHAKEN/STIR,
the almost free and unfettered access to telephone call recipients
would be removed as a device for scammers to use to reach large
numbers of people. Or at least, until this system is defeated by other scammer methods, within telephony or without.
Indeed, Congress has recently made noise about robocalling, ulth
timately, moving forward with a display of bipartisanship. The 115
Congress conducted three hearings between 2017 and 2019 about

/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-james-bond-alcohol-shaken-not-stirred-20131212-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RQF7-PHAW].
208. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 8.
209. See id. at 8–10.
210. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 206.
211. Id.
212. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 9.
213. Id. at 8–10.
214. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Mandates that Phone Companies
Implement Caller ID Authentication to Combat Spoofed Robocalls (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-363399A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYG8S59L].
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the robocall scourge and passed thirteen bills. In 2019, Congress
finally enacted into law the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal
216
Enforcement and Deterrence Act (the TRACED Act), which at217
tracted over eighty co-sponsors.
The TRACED Act does not add much to the existing enforcement frameworks, aside from enhanced penalties for robocal218
ling. But enhancing penalties will not likely deter those who perceive no possibility of being caught, like overseas operators, or
219
those with no assets, however. Apart from enhancing penalties,
the Act merely promotes the establishment of interagency working
groups to study and report to Congress on the problem and enables the FCC to promulgate appropriate rules to accommodate
220
SHAKEN/STIR.
Cynically, one might conclude that the TRACED Act merely enables authors, sponsors, and supporters to brag to constituents that
they are working across the aisle to fight against a universally detested and common practice, without accomplishing much. The
substance of the TRACED Act brings to mind the admonition of
two-time presidential candidate and businessman, H. Ross Perot:
“If you see a snake, just kill it—don’t appoint a committee on
221
snakes.”
Certainly, this legislation “appoint[s] a committee on snakes,”
while increasing the bounty on snakes. But can these snakes actually be killed? As the character Dr. Steven Price warned about snakes
in the classic film Snakes on a Plane, “[m]ake it fast. Time is tis222
sue.” Observers have pointed out that “early iterations” of the
technology needed to implement a plan like SHAKEN/STIR have

215. Emily Birnbaum, Senate Passes Bill Penalizing Illegal Robcalls, THE HILL (May 23,
2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/445255-senate-passes-bill-penalizing-illegalrobocalls [https://perma.cc/Y46A-A43G].
216. Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019).
217. Birnbaum, supra note 215.
218. See Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 3, 133 Stat. 3274, 3274-76 (2019).
219. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 183 (1968) (The probability of prosecution for the overseas fraudsters might approach
zero, so the “rational” fraudster would likely not be deterred much by any increase in penalty).
220. S. 151 - Pallone-Thune TRACED Act, 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/151/ [https://perma.cc/DH7XABGU].
221. Jessica Kwong, Ross Perot Quotes: Most Famous Lines from Former Third-party Presidential
Candidate, NEWSWEEK (July 9, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/ross-perot-famous-quotes1448287 [https://perma.cc/YJ3S-K6RY].
222. SNAKES ON A PLANE (NEW LINE CINEMA 2006).
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223

been extant since 2006. Regulatory movement and enforcement
have been slow to arrive, even as the menace has developed in the
years since.
As the public sector regulates and enforces, and the private sector collaborates on enforcement, development, and implementation of technological solutions, many predict the scammers will
adapt and innovate, and robocalls and their associated scams will
224
continue. Any “committee on snakes” that produces a snake
study would have to account for the evolutionary biology that will
follow the first wave of diversion and killing of the snakes.
For example, some predict that scammers will defeat
SHAKEN/STIR and other initiatives “by buying cheap, ‘legitimate’
United States-based numbers in the hundreds, maybe thousands,”
225
Will an industryinstead of spoofing them from abroad.
regulatory partnership be “nimble enough to catch spammers as
226
they adapt”?
Other observers believe that the FCC and other regulators must
emerge as the leaders here, even though the telecom providers are
227
closer to the technology and the fraud. This is because private
telecom players lack a financial incentive to defeat robocalling
scammers. Certainly, voice communication, though at the historic
core of their offerings, does not project into their priorities for innovation. Voice calls “are dirt cheap” and not lucrative, for one
228
thing. And no direct loss accrues to the telecom providers from
229
these scams unless and until regulators put certain compliance
onuses on them. After all, “why invest a lot of resources [into
blocking robocalls] when “developing 5G networks” appears to be
the next field for competitive investment? The providers will be
less likely to invest in old technology unless given a push.
The flag-waving of the ninety-seven senators who voted for the
TRACED Act may enable them to return home to brag about passing a law, but the act provides no real push besides an added
measure of accountability for agency focus on the problem. If the
robocalling snakes had a lobby, and could breathe sighs of relief,

223. Editorial, You’re About to Get Fewer Robocalls. But Maybe Not for Long, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/opinion/robocalls-phone-scams.html
[https://perma.cc/R38Z-JVU6].
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Jake Swearingen, Spam Robocalls Aren’t Slowing Down. Here’s the Tech that Could Stop
Them, N.Y. MAG. (May 16, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/how-to-stopspam-robocalls-with-stir-shaken.html [https://perma.cc/56CZ-9FPA].
227. Editoral, supra note 223.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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their lobby would still breathe easily, even if the House of Representatives passed this legislation and it was signed into law.
B. Enforcement Initiatives
The FCC and the FTC have taken a host of enforcement actions
against violators of the aforementioned laws and regulations, but
that does not seem to have stemmed the growth of impostor scams.
Perhaps the growth continues because enforcement does not effectively reach the overseas generators of impostor scams. It is worth
noting the efforts because they are substantial, yet the incidence of
these scams has continued to grow.
During the period between 2010 and 2018, the FCC “took enforcement actions involving proposed or imposed monetary forfeitures . . . against violators or apparent violators of either the Truth
230
in Caller ID Act or the TCPA” that totaled nearly $250 million,
231
reflecting 140 enforcement actions. Warning citations have also
232
been issued to over three dozen violators. The FCC highlighted
seven enforcement examples in their Robocall Report that apparently typify the magnitude of the problem, but also highlight the
233
limitations of their reach—they are all domestic examples.
In one of the highlighted forfeiture cases, the one of the largest
magnitude, a single person was held to account for launching a
staggering “96 million illegal spoofed robocalls” over the course of
three months, impostoring major hotel chains and online travel
234
agencies, including Hilton, Marriott, Expedia, and TripAdvisor.
Adrian Abramovich allegedly used robocalling and neighbor Caller
ID spoofing tactics to induce people to hear a message falsely pur235
porting affiliation with legitimate travel companies. Through his
network of Florida companies, he was directing calls to travel
agencies that directed calls to Mexican call centers selling Mexican
236
timeshares and vacation packages. For perspective, that amounts
237
to twelve calls made per second, and, by one description, would

230. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 10.
231. Id. at 11. A description of selected enforcement actions indicates that most of these
actions pursued smaller fines. The Abramovich action described below accounts for $120
million. Id.
232. Id. at 10.
233. See id. at 10–11.
234. Id. at 10.
235. In re Adrian Abramovich, Mktg. Strategy Lenders, Inc., & Mktg. Leaders, Inc., Forfeiture Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 4663, 4665 (May 10, 2018).
236. Id. at 4664.
237. Ethan Wolffe-Mann, How TripAdvisor Hunted a Robocaller that Made 100 Million Calls
to Random People, YAHOO FIN. (June 27, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tripadvisor-
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qualify the perpetrator for the “Guinness World Record,” if there
238
were such a thing, for robocalling.
Note, however, that though part of the scheme took place outside the United States, the lead perpetrator, his entities, and assets,
resided in Florida, which made enforcement easier. The FCC began investigating Abramovich due to complaints from a medical
paging company about dangerous interference with their network
239
from a massive onslaught of outbound calls. Not only was enforcement able to reach Abramovich at his actual front door, but
the United States Senate was also able to subpoena his appear240
ance. It is forgivable for the FCC to lead their reporting on enforcement with this massive and satisfying win, but this result may
not typify the sort of enforcement actions that must be taken to
shut down the robocalling and spoofing mechanisms.
Similar efforts have been made to bring enforcement actions
against people and entities, all within jurisdictional reach. The
FCC alleged that Philip Roesel, a resident of Wilmington, North
241
Carolina, generated over twenty-one million robocalls, including
eighty-two thousand spoofed calls, through his insurance marketing businesses during the period between October 2016 and Janu242
ary 2017.
Roesel flooded recipients with these unlawful phone calls “in
order to drum up sales of the health insurance policies he and his
243
associated agents were selling.” His businesses had been set up to
“generate leads for himself and other affiliated agents” for the sale
244
of “health insurance products.” Roesel used false CallerID information to “avoid detection” and “evade law enforcement” and
thus “make it more likely that unwitting consumers would answer
245
the phone.” The impostor here deployed these tactics to achieve
the ultimate goal of generating business. Ultimately, this typical
scheme led to the FCC imposing an eighty-two million dollar pen-

hunted-robocaller-made-100-million-calls-random-people-124348420.html
[https://perma.cc/PL8Y-U8PZ].
238. Rob Wile, Miami Man Made Nearly 100 Million Robocalls. Now He’s Paying a Big Price,
MIA.
HERALD
(May
11,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article210861109.html.
239. The FCC enjoyed extensive assistance from TripAdvisor, one of the companies impostored. See Palmer, supra note 141; In re Adrian Abramovich, 33 FCC Rcd. at 4664–65.
240. Palmer, supra note 141.
241. See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Proposes $82 Million Fine for
Spoofed Robocalls (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-82-millionfine-spoofed-telemarketing-robocalls [https://perma.cc/G5E2-9G4W].
242. In re Best Ins. Contracts, Inc., & Philip Roesel, dba Wilmington Ins. Quotes, Notice
of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 33 FCC Rcd. 6403, 6403, 6414 (Sept. 26, 2018).
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. at 6–7, 9.
245. Id. at 9.
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alty on Roesel and his entities, an amount which he claimed he
246
would have a great difficulty paying. Again, in this highlighted
instance, the robocalling spoofer impostor was within reach of the
authorities.
The third highest penalty in the report, thirty-seven million dollars, was also levied against an alleged domestic offender, Afforda247
ble Enterprises of Arizona, LLC. Affordable Enterprises generated over two million robocalls through a telemarketing platform,
more than thirty thousand of which the FCC verified to be
248
spoofed. In this matter, a former employee of the entity, which
marketed home remodeling and improvement services, blew the
whistle on the operation to the FCC and revealed the inner work249
ings of the scheme.
Affordable Enterprises purchased a list of home and cell phone
numbers of individuals and called them, using the numbers from
prepaid cell phones purchased at Walmart as the spoofed identi250
ty. A significant effort was made to conceal the identity of the
calling entity in order to further the scheme. If call recipients
called back to complain, the Affordable Enterprises employees had
been instructed to pick up the phone to apologize and limit the
251
conservations to minimize conflict. In addition, if a burner
phone number generated too many complaints, the company
252
would discard it. Consumers reported to the FCC that they had
been ridiculed and harassed by some of the employees when returning the calls and failed to receive identifying information
253
about to whom the number belonged.
This enterprise yielded remarkable financial success. The whistleblowing employee reported that the center was generating
254
$300,000 per month from these calls. This operation continued
for well over a year, right in Tucson, Arizona. As with the Roesel
matter, no evidence surfaced that the actual services being marketed were illegitimate, but the imposture was a key vehicle in getting
leads.
These three operations represent the largest fines in the robocall cases highlighted by the FCC in its report. The other four

246. Id. at 20–24.
247. In re Affordable Enters. of Ariz., LLC, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 33
FCC Rcd. 9233 (Sept. 26, 2018).
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 3–4.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.

648

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:3

actions listed in the FCC report involve penalties under three million dollars, and a few well under that. They were all also domestic:
255
a dialing technology and service platform, based in New Mexico;
a stalker and his co-worker, located in New York, making menacing
256
and threatening phone calls to an ex-spouse; another travel mar257
258
keter located in Florida; and an Alabama bank. In total, the
FCC reported only three enforcement actions in the robocalling
report that involved imposture or spoofing, and all were domestic.
Not to be outdone, the FTC and approximately two dozen state
and local enforcement agencies “announced a major crackdown
on illegal robocalls, including 94 actions targeting operations
259
around the country.” The June 2019 initiative was deemed “Op260
eration Call it Quits.” The Operation Call it Quits complaints
and actions were directed toward actors similar to the ones pursued by the FCC.
Among those in the net of Operation Call it Quits are alleged
impostor scams, including a complaint against a “dialer”/“information technology guy” who supposedly used Caller ID
261
spoofing as part of his services to other scammers. Another FTC
target used a pre-recorded message pretending to be “John from
the shipping department,” falsely informing call recipients “that a
medical alert system had been purchased for them, and they could
receive it ‘at no cost whatsoever.’ ” 262 Although this operation skirt-

255. In re Dialing Servs., LLC, Forfeiture Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 6192 (July 26, 2017).
256. In re Steven Blumenstock & Gary Braver, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture,
31 FCC Rcd. 8648 (Aug. 2, 2016). These individuals used a third-party spoofing service to
modulate their voices, and the number appears to be from locations such as prisons.
Though this use of imposture is highly disturbing and worthy of serious attention, this article focuses on the use of imposture at higher volume for financial gain and to further swindles. Id.
257. In re Travel Club Mktg., Inc., Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 8861 (11) (Aug. 11,
2015). Note that imposture and caller identification spoofing did not appear to be involved
in this scheme. At the time, this action held the record for the highest robocalling fine.
Chris Morran, Travel Club Telemarketer Fined $2.96M for Robocalling Consumers, CONSUMERIST
(Aug. 11, 2015), https://consumerist.com/2015/08/11/travel-club-telemarketer-fined-296m-for-robocalling-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/E9HQ-NMMU].
258. In re Sec. First of Ala., LLC, Forfeiture Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 2377 (Feb. 13, 2015)
(also note that imposture was not part of this scheme).
259. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce New
Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal [https://
perma.cc/WSU7-YA49].
260. Id.
261. See Complaint, United States v. Derek James Bartoli, No. 19-1160 (M.D. Fla. June 21,
2019); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce New
Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal [https://
perma.cc/WSU7-YA49].
262. Press Release, supra note 259; see also Stipulated Order Permanent Injunction and
Monetary Judgment, FTC v. Lifewatch, No. 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2019).
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ed the line of pure imposture, the operators falsely claimed product endorsement from credible authorities “like the American
Heart Association, American Diabetes Association, National Institute on Aging, or the AARP.” 263
FTC declared that these entities were “responsible for more than
one billion calls pitching a variety of products and services including credit card interest rate reduction services, money-making op264
portunities, and medical alert systems.” Just like the FCC actions,
however, the targets, though significant, are all only within domes265
tic reach. Although the FTC and FCC appear to have overlapping
missions and actions, both have enforcement authority. As one observer put it, though there are certain “legal distinctions,” “the FTC
is the sheriff here . . . prosecut[ing] shady business practices,” but
“other state and federal agencies, including the [FCC], also police
266
nuisance calls.” But as the FTC told one reporter, “there are
267
enough violators in this space to keep us both busy.”
C. A Bleak Prognosis
Jealousy of interagency authority does not appear to be the obstacle to stopping impostor scams. The FTC has established enforcement operations and the FCC likely has closer familiarity with
the technology. 268 As the FTC staff attorney dedicated as the “point
person on robocalls” explained, “the FTC is largely a civil law enforcement agency. We have a whole lot of attorneys, and a whole
lot of economists, and a few technologists . . . we don’t have the
269
expertise.”
Although all of these FCC, FTC, state, and local enforcement actions appear worthy of pursuit and resources, the massive problem
of using telephone voice calls to achieve impostor scams is unlikely
to be addressed this way. This leaves solving the problem to the
technologists. Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey recognized the challenge of using domestic rules and law enforcement. “There is a problem with a lot of these calls emanating from

263. Press Release, supra note 259; Stipulated Order Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, FTC v. Lifewatch, No. 1:15-cv-05781 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2019).
264. Press Release, supra note 259.
265. Id.
266. van Zuylen-Wood, supra note 135.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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overseas, [thus] [t]he practicalities of enforcement become prob270
lematic.”
The FCC concedes Attorney General Healey’s point at the end
of its Report on Robocalls as one of its primary enforcement challenge. “Many illegal robocallers are operating in foreign countries.
Although Congress recently gave the Commission express jurisdiction over foreign Caller ID spoofers, in practice the Commission
271
may also need cooperation from foreign governments.”
Alex Quilici also offers some reasoned pessimism about regulatory and enforcement solutions to robocalls. 272 (YouMail also provides a variety of blocking services for phone users, so his pessi273
mism may offer his business some grounds for optimism.) Quilici
notes that “phone spam,” as he deems it, cannot be controlled as
274
easily as “email spam.” Scammers have some fundamental advantages in telephony that they do not have in the email sphere,
275
which can be better controlled through algorithms.
For example, emails that are flagged as spam by email providers
are still available if the recipient wants to safely inspect them, but
they are separated from other messages and, therefore, suspicion is
276
heightened. There are no spam folders for storing phone calls,
277
however. “Once the robocall is bounced at the network level, the
278
consumer never sees it.” Phone service providers do not want to
inadvertently prevent a recipient from receiving a legitimate message. Quilici added, “No carrier wants to make national news because grandma tried to reach her grandson to go to the hospital
but her call was blocked. Robocall blocking is complicated. You
279
have to figure out if a number is misbehaving.”
With telephone scams, Quilici observes that “the bad guys keep
finding new ways and new numbers to lure you into answering the
phone and falling for the scam. For them, it’s easy and cheap to
280
operate, difficult to trace and extremely lucrative.” He notes that
accessing the phone network, acquiring and disguising numbers,

270. Elaine S. Povich, States Try to Silence Robocalls, but They’re Worse Than Ever, PEW
STATELINE (July 25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2018/07/25/states-try-to-silence-robocalls-but-theyre-worse-than-ever
[https://
perma.cc/C9N5-EXHU].
271. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 160, at 14.
272. See Robertson, supra note 151.
273. See YOUMAIL, https://www.youmail.com [https://perma.cc/S5KS-ERAU].
274. See Robertson, supra note 151.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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and switching phone service providers can be done with ease.
Although Quilici concedes that there will be some advancement in
the blocking of illegal calls with new framework approaches like
SHAKEN/STIR, “it won’t be a panacea. We’ve never seen regula282
tion solve technical problems.” Yet, he retains some measured
optimism about robocalls: “Even though we’re at an all-time
high . . . [and] the numbers may be creeping up a little bit . . . the
situations seems to be mostly stable at this point. We have not
283
turned the corner, but maybe the corner is in sight.”
No miracles should be expected. The “[hope] that, ‘poof,’ robocalls will just be gone [is] the wrong mind-set,” according to a
senior consultant at one of the industry standards bodies, but the
systems are in place to bring the calls “down to a manageable lev284
el.”
There have been some efforts to address the problem by attacking call centers overseas that are operating full-on impostor
285
scams. But the question will remain. The coordination of international law enforcement resources may be prioritized to focus on
other areas of higher urgency and importance, like terrorism and
human trafficking, rather than phone calls.
If the impracticalities of enforcement hold, the solution to curbing modern impostor scamming lies in finding strategic ways to
raise the risks and costs of scamming. This is best accomplished
through the pursuit of proactive technological solutions that disrupt the intermediary mechanisms for scamming on a large scale,
through precisely targeted enforcement and education. Perhaps at
some point, voice calling will not be trusted or might even be
abandoned, as alternate means of popular communication take
286
hold. Fewer people will answer telephone calls. But would that
not simply shift the scammers to communications mediums that
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Lily Hay Newman, The Robocall Crisis Will Never Be Fixed, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.wired.com/story/robocalls-spam-fix-stir-shaken/
[https://perma.cc/52F43F3B].
284. Id.
285. Though the efforts do not appear to be full scale, some overseas scams have been
investigated and prosecuted. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Three Defendants
and India-based Call Center Indicted in Phone Scam Targeting U.S. Victims (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/three-defendants-and-india-based-call-centerindicted-phone-scam-targeting-us-victims [https://perma.cc/Q7PS-SYAG]; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Indian National Convicted of Role in Call Center Scam that Victimized
Thousands in the U.S. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/indiannational-convicted-role-call-center-scam-victimized-thousands-us [https://perma.cc/8CMYZ348].
286. See Newman, supra note 283 (“Much like the firehose of spam that made email almost unusable in the late 1990s, robocalls have made people in the US wary of picking up
their cell phones and landlines.”).
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remain more trustworthy, like texting, social media, and other applications?
The robocalling “cat and mouse” game has not ended, and the
people playing the role of cat seem to know that the mouse shall
287
adapt and return. As noted, SHAKEN/STIR still allows the use of
“legitimate phone numbers” for scams—it just will block spoofed
288
ones from reaching their destination. The industry and FCC have
expressed awareness that these changes will “inevitably spur criminal innovation in robocalling to evade or manipulate the new cryp289
tographic baseline.”
In fact, Quilici points out that the improved ability to flag suspicious calls by apps and providers has compelled an acceleration in
290
the number of calls made. The robocallers need to make more
phone calls in order to overwhelm those systems. “If you don’t answer the phone, the robocaller has to work harder, so they gener291
ate more calls. It’s a death spiral.”
And although the death spiral can be slowed down, the meshing
of technology with the ability to impostor always returns. Ultimately, the determined and bold impostor scammer can accomplish
seemingly anything, manipulating trust, authority, and fear and
deploying technology in all sorts of ways. What amount of education or technological advancement will stop modern-day Spanish
prisoner scams, where the perpetrators are hiding overseas?
The approach that I propose suggests more concentrated ways
to combat the impostor fraud problem. The efforts underway to
address impostor scammers through telecommunications provide a
starting point, but more than that, they provide an example of a
pragmatic approach for slowing the roll of the basic scam. By forcing scammers to resort to less-preferred means of communications,
or to engage in the search for new means, the logistical difficulty of
pulling off scams and the cost of executing scams should increase.
This would mean that the impostor scam might be less prevalent
if the economics could be shifted back to resemble that of the
scams embodied in the Spanish prisoner mailings and the salesperson imposture in Hoddeson. One way to achieve this would be to
take a “least-cost avoider” approach toward these scam busting efforts, putting to work those who operate and profit from offering
the intermediary services that enable the fraudsters. They have the
means, opportunity, and expertise to make impostor scamming

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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more difficult. Certain industries can take voluntary measures to
choke impostor fraud, and regulators and lawmakers can formally
incentivize certain players to take action.
IV. FINDING THE RIGHT WARRIORS TO FIGHT IMPOSTOR FRAUD
Ultimately, a policy approach should aim to make impostor
fraud riskier and more expensive. The scammer’s scheme in Hoddeson v. Koos Brothers, though effective against both the consumer
and the store, would be difficult to execute on mass scale without
detection. Impostors thrive on concealment of identity and eluding identification, and as noted, schemes like that one required
more risk and could not operate at a scale like that of an operation
that could leverage technologies like robocalling, ID spoofing, social media networks, or easily-accessible payment systems.
Regulators could require more vigilance from these chokepoint
fraud intermediaries. Additional voluntary measures, if coordinated, might also help. Successful impostor fraud has always relied
upon marrying emotions of fear and greed with the best and
cheapest means for exploiting them. Those who straddle these
“means” have the best knowledge of their mechanisms and the best
opportunity to police their abuse. Many already have some incentives to do so—a social media platform for dating, for example, already wants to avoid reputational damage from misuse, but perhaps these sorts of entities can absorb more burden. They are
classic examples of least-cost avoiders for preventing this social
harm.
A. Finding the Least-Cost Avoiders
A least-cost avoider approach would focus on ensuring that
those entities that engage in activities that yield a harm absorb the
cost of that harm. This would compel entities to internalize the
harm in a way that would motivate them to manage and contend
292
with these costs. A least-cost avoider mindset can help policymakers design the most efficient system and framework for combating impostors, making their scams more difficult to execute. A
framework that assigns a duty to the intermediaries and owners of
instrumentalities who benefit from providing these services to the

292. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (an embryonic discussion of the implications of least-cost avoidance
principles).
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public would be justifiable from a distributive standpoint and effi293
ciency standpoint. That is, those who profit from offering a service should internalize more costs and thus more burdens.
Summarizing the vast literature that explains and applies the
least-cost avoider (LCA) concept proves challenging, but a revisit
of the basics offers worthwhile context. As Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed summarized Justice Holmes, “[p]erhaps the
simplest reason for a particular entitlement is to minimize the administrative costs of enforcement,” unless shifting the burden im294
proves welfare. Allowing the costs of impostor fraud to fall where
they lie would be certainly the most inexpensive system to administer. Calabresi and Melamed observed the social problem that follows from only applying this “simplest reason,” concluding that
minimizing administration “by itself . . . will never justify any result
295
except that of letting the stronger win.”
Aside from the scattered enforcement measures discussed above,
letting the costs of impostor fraud fall where they lie seems to be
the dominant system in place, and that approach has apparently
enabled impostor fraud to flourish. In our current system, victims
of impostor fraud appear to bear most costs. Scammers, by and
large, seem to be beyond the reach of the system, and intermediaries bear little burden.
Famously, Calabresi and Melamed laid out the premise of the
least-cost avoider (LCA), which has been much discussed over the
past half-century. An LCA-themed framework could lead to the
most efficient solution to minimize the impact of impostor fraud
and other associated problems. As they wrote, “economic efficiency
standing alone would dictate that set of entitlements which favors
knowledgeable choices between social benefits and the social costs
of obtaining them, and between social costs and the social costs of
296
avoiding them.” They suggest “the cost should be put on the par297
ty or activity best located to make such a cost-benefit analysis.”
Are consumers the LCAs here or are the intermediaries the
LCAs? The operators of intermediaries have technological capabilities and a centralized knowledge base that the potential targets do
not have. Scammers are able to study and exploit these systems and

293. See generally Benjamin Edelman, Least-Cost Avoiders in Online Fraud and Abuse, 8 SEC.
& PRIV. ECON. 78 (2010) (discussing the roles that the Communications Decency Act and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act play in involving intermediaries in policing defamation and copyright violations, respectively).
294. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1096.
297. Id.
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experiment with using them to their ends. These intermediaries
are better positioned, as repeat players, to create and mine their
own knowledge base about how scammers use their platform and
to develop and implement approaches to fight impostors. Scammers have asymmetric information relative to consumers about
how to exploit these systems and the intermediaries have the best
means for leveling out these advantages. Consumers do not work
full time to detect scams and even if they are able to avoid some of
them with common sense, this Article has documented that some
impostors are sophisticated enough to deceive anyone. Therefore,
attempting to induce stronger consumer detection efforts through
liability assignment is unlikely to alter the frequency of impostor
fraud significantly.
Unsurprisingly, and perhaps reflecting these observations, proposals have been made to apply these LCA principles to address
the slightly different scourge of identity theft, which can play a role
in impostor fraud. Again, impostor fraud focuses on the impact on
those who have been deceived by false identity, whereas identity
theft focuses on the impact on those who have had their identities
stolen. In 2004, Jeff Sovern suggested that the burden should be
shifted from consumers to creditors, and the credit bureaus should
298
absorb losses. He identified the “credit industry” as the LCA of
identity theft and suggested that if they bore the costs, they would
299
have more of an incentive to combat this social problem. Over a
decade later, Mark Geistfeld recognized that private tort law alone
would be insufficient to address the identity theft problem, even
300
with the application of strict liability principles. Geistfeld concluded that such an approach to identity theft could “only com301
plement other regulatory efforts.” Because the operators of intermediaries may not be sufficiently internalizing the costs of
fraud, market forces will not solve this growing impostor scam
problem unless some burdens are shifted. Ordinarily, one might
ask what the optimal level of impostor fraud might be—that is,
what level of fraud might be tolerable in the aggregate? For now,
the concern can be leveled at the mere growth of impostor fraud
over time, both in terms of incidence and magnitude of losses.
With impostor fraud, the problem may be broader and require
more of a coordinated regulatory attack than identity fraud. Impostor fraud has many more chokepoints. In essence, the credit

298. Jeff Sovern, Stopping Identity Theft, 38 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 233 (2004).
299. See id.
300. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted to Others in Business
Transactions: Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Tort Liability, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (2017).
301. Id. at 412.
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industry is the “chokepoint” for much of identity fraud, maintaining the ability to manage and verify credit and identity information, while financially benefiting from lending and maintaining
this data. The chokepoints for impostor fraud are broader and
cross multiple sectors of the economy, as well as emerging technologies.
Impostor fraud should be treated as a byproduct of the profitable activity of providing telecommunications services, social media
services, or stored-value money cards. All of those create social value, but can also produce a destructive social byproduct akin to “ac302
cidents or pollution.” “The costs should be put on the party or
activity which can, with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to correct an error in entitlements by inducing the party who
303
can avoid social costs most cheaply to do so.” There are measures
that intermediaries and instrumentalities can take to avoid social
costs, and given their knowledge of technology and repeat-player
wisdom, they may be in the LCA position.
Of course, macro decisions need to be made about how much to
economically burden these intermediaries, much in the same
manner that decisions were made about how much to burden (or
unburden) information and content distribution intermediaries.
The model does not mesh perfectly with the classic CalabresiMelamed application to accidents, in that we are not addressing a
problem of legitimate operators engaging in risky activities. But
this impostor problem may call for an approach “in which the
permitted level and manner of accident-causing activities is deter304
mined collectively,” if one can define an incident of impostor
fraud as an “accident” that can spill over from the activity of
providing an infrastructure for communication or money transfer.
Although only one “avoider” can truly qualify as the “least” of the
LCAs, a few contenders emerge.
B. Shifting Burdens to Communications Intermediaries and
Payment Systems
To address impostor fraud, policymakers and regulators can allocate more responsibility to providers of telecommunications services, social media services, and stored-value card offerors for ab305
sorbing the costs of impostor fraud. Regulators and lawmakers

302.
303.
304.
305.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 294, at 1096–97.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1097 n.19.
Such measures do not preclude self-regulation.
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can mandate adoption of certain technologies, mandate disclosure
of warnings (akin to safety warnings), or otherwise place restrictions on their business practices to decrease the incidence of
impostor fraud. Of course, many instrumentalities and intermediaries can be used to perpetrate impostor fraud, but these services
appear to be among those strategically positioned to intervene if
required, or otherwise incentivized, to do so. Fraudulent innovation can never be squelched, given the opportunities and potential
payoffs to scammers, but an LCA approach demonstrates that
more care can be taken by the entities that economically benefit
from these systems. As controllers of key chokepoints, however,
these sectors are in a superior position to block or intervene in
fraud than the intended victims. Having perhaps greater
knowledge about these scams, their fraud reporting obligations
should also be stronger, as they can better alert both regulators
306
and citizens.
1. Telecommunications Carriers
The push from lawmakers, regulators, and enforcement to pressure telecommunications-carrier intermediaries to solve this problem has been a focus for those who have studied the evolving robocall problem for several years. 307 Mass impostor scams rely on a
“ ‘chokepoint’ in which illegal conduct may be cut-off and de308
terred.” Applying pressure at this chokepoint will raise the costs
of enacting such prolific impostor scams but will require both government intervention and incentives for industry innovation and
cooperation.
In 2014, the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies (ICAS)
published an extensive and thorough report assessing the state of
TCPA effectiveness, suggesting “certain modifications and improvements” to the 1991 statute in the wake of technological and
309
other developments in the years since passage. Spencer Weber
Waller and the co-authors of this report recognized the difficult
310
challenges of enforcement in the wake of evolving technology.
306. See generally David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 45 (2007) (proposing leveraging fraud reporting in a way that adapts to new scams).
307. Spencer Weber Waller, Daniel Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, Loyola U. Chi. Sch. L.,
Inst. for Consumer Antitrust Stud., The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Adapting
Consumer Protection to Changing Technology 61 (Loyola U. Chi. Sch. L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Rsch. Paper No. 2013-016, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2327266 [https://perma.cc/JB54-RT54].
308. Id. at 60.
309. Id. at 4–6.
310. See id. at 36.
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Prior to the current impostor scam proliferation, they observed the
futility of stopping “calls . . . routed through a ‘web of automatic
311
dialers, caller ID spoofing, and [voIP] protocols.’ ” They recognized that the TCPA’s effectiveness depended on the robust use of
312
313
the “private right of action” —not public enforcement.
The ICAS report observed that the private right of action would
provide little incentive for private actors to pursue and deter “intentional violators” like the impostor-scam perpetrators of concern
here, as they were designed to deter “otherwise legitimate compa314
nies.” Further, “when TCPA violators are located overseas or are
judgment proof, there is little incentive for an individual or class of
private plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit. The effort becomes futile when the
315
violator cannot even be located.” As noted, “companies that are increasingly responsible for the majority of TCPA violations are located overseas,” 316 where many of the impostor scams originate,
true to their Spanish prisoner heritage.
Though the ICAS report makes many recommendations, for example, to redouble efforts to stop unlawful Caller ID manipula317
tion, ultimately, the report recognizes that these recommendations cannot effectively address overseas-operated impostor fraud
that already violates the law. “Government enforcement is necessary. Private parties do not possess the resources or the incentive to
318
track and locate entities located outside the United States.”
Given the weakness of laws on the books, including the toothless
recently-enacted TRACED Act and the chokepoint position of telecommunications providers, carriers should carry more of a burden
as a potential LCA of impostor fraud. The available technology to
verify caller identity has evolved to a point where carriers are able
to make massive calling more difficult and expensive—and more
innovative. The more expensive the generation of impostor scam
calls is to impostors, the fewer calls there will be. These calls are an
externality absorbed by consumer subscribers that result from consumers using the services, and consumer use benefits the carriers.
Although some consumers can and do avoid the scourge, the owner and controller of the chokepoint and its technology can more
easily perform the choking.

311. Id.
312. Id. The TPCA enables private plaintiffs to sue for $500 for each separate violation
and $1,500 if the violation is willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3), (f)(1).
313. See Waller et al., supra note 307, at 36.
314. Id. at 37.
315. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 45.
317. Id. at 60.
318. Id. at 45.
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Even if only some impostor scams can be choked, the technological mass production of outbound calls could be slowed down. If
policymakers design and enforce legislation and regulation to incentivize carriers, and carriers innovate and demonstrate proactivity, impostor phone calls should diminish. Of course, if robocalls
start to stop, more people might regain trust in inbound phone
calls, more calls might be answered because recipients could let
their guard down, and a new, different wave of imposture could
begin via the same telecommunications systems. As previously noted, if the industry follows through on SHAKEN/STIR in some version, there are already means for scammers to defeat this system by
buying identifiable phone numbers that enable scammers to continue to robocall. Lawmakers, regulators, and the private sector
must always try to maintain tabs on how scammers abuse technology. If the gatekeepers stand still, the costs of imposture will drop
again, and it will reemerge. In fact, they must make all efforts to
stay ahead of the scammers and not rest on the recent regulatory
innovations and technological gains.. Once again, the telecom sector, having access to how their technology is abused, are in an LCA
position and responsibility should be shifted accordingly.
Right now, it is worth asking whether executing something like a
“grandparent scam” by telephone would still be possible, even after
SHAKEN/STIR. Certainly, as the way things are, scammers could
use burner phones, and possibly even spoof them to present numbers that pretend to be a hospital or law enforcement. Tightening
regulation on the sale of burner phones, particularly when purchased in bulk, might solve this problem, but, certainly, scammers
can find other, perhaps less easy, means. Email spoofing could still
be used if the scammer skims information from social media. But
such measures by scammers require more skill and expense to execute, so one would expect fewer grandparent scams. The IRS and
Social Security scams in their current forms, however, could be
significantly slowed down, as could the widespread scourge of imposture of hospitality providers through blast systems.
Given that impostor scam reports now exceed identity theft
scams on the FTC Sentinel report, pushing the LCAs to mitigate
high-volume generation of impostor calls would have an outsized
impact, at least in the near term. Unfortunately, this approach
alone would not be enough to put a permanent dent in the problem. For example, another medium used to exploit people
through imposture, email and social media, will be explored in the
next subsection, and none of the above telecommunications efforts
address that potential chokepoint.
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2. Social Media and Email Systems
Social media platforms and email systems provide ample opportunities for scammers to pretend that they are someone they are
not. Social media impostor scams are distinct from basic email impostor scams. For contrast, in a pure email “phishing” scam, a
scammer can scour organizational websites for organizational hierarchies, scan or scrape email addresses, and discern supervisor and
319
colleague relationships. They can easily create an email account
that spoofs a supervisor, for example, to impersonate and scam
subordinates and colleagues with an urgent plea to help them out
320
of a temporary cash fix. (After all, a “boss” needs to be accommodated and can always be trusted to pay the money back.) A few
primary ways to address these scams right now are to educate people in organizations about phishing and apply pressure on the
“payment” chokepoint.
Straight-up email scams present a problem, but social media
platforms afford certain scammers with even more high-powered
tools for imposture, including the ability to create a false persona
or impersonate a real person, establish a long-distance relationship
(often with the promise of romance), and manipulate targets into
handing them their money. The elements of the basic Spanish
prisoner routine are present. There is an emotional appeal, per321
haps a deeper one here that takes longer to cultivate. The scammers can launch their entire scam from overseas, in countries
322
where enforcement and tracking would be almost impossible.
323
The payment systems involved are easy to manipulate and, under
the right circumstances, a scammer can score a significant amount
324
of money from victims.

319. See, e.g., U.C. BERKELEY INFO. SEC. OFF., PHISHING EXAMPLES ARCHIVE,
https://security.berkeley.edu/education-awareness/phishing/phishing-examples-archive
[https://perma.cc/U3HA-TAY5].
320. See id.
321. See generally Romance Scams: Online Impostors Break Hearts and Bank Accounts, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/romance-scams
[https://perma.cc/Q264-JVJ6].
322. See generally id. (for example, two Nigerian nationals pleaded guilty in U.S. federal
court to participating in an elaborate romance scam scheme, but at least one of the perpetrators remains at large).
323. See generally Online Dating Scams Infographic, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO.
(Feb. 2020), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0560-online-dating-scams-infographic
[https://perma.cc/Z77M-4M4V] (warning against wiring money, using or sending gift or
reloadable cash cards, or sending cash to previously-unknown people who “profess love
quickly” online).
324. See generally FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, supra note 321 (scammers in this case extracted at least $2 million from one victim).
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If the scammers are beyond the reach of recovery, who should
bear the cost of the scam? The victims bear some personal responsibility, but they are often the targets of masterful schemes of manipulation, facilitated by the vehicles of social media that enable
scammers to gather personal information from targets and create
realistic-looking impostor profiles. The New York Times profiled a
common version of the romance scam, where the scammer used
the unique tools provided by Facebook as the means for generat325
ing a false romantic connection. This scam drew upon the imposture of real military personnel through the misappropriation of
326
their likeness and creation of their own narrative.
Congressman Adam Kinzinger, himself a repeated victim of
identity spoofing, followed up after the Times story with a letter to
Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg, asking him to
provide extensive information about Facebook’s identity security
problems and the magnitude of efforts to prevent scammers from
327
using their tools. Although Kinzinger has yet to craft legislation
to address this problem, he suggests that Facebook consider means
of user identity authentication, such as using facial recognition
technology or other proof of identification to establish or retain an
328
account.
As Facebook starts to explore developing its own cryptocurrency
and confronts accompanying regulatory concerns on that front,
they may need to take more measures to mitigate damage from
329
scams perpetrated through their platform. The marriage of a
platform that manages both identities and currency transactions
could prove to be an even more potent tool for scammers if appropriate measures are not taken to mitigate risk.
Facebook may be an example of an LCA in that they control the
gate to those who use their platforms. They already exercise the
power to ban real people from using their services, and they have
more information and resources to verify accounts than their us-

325. See Jack Nicas, Facebook Connected Her to a Tattooed Soldier in Iraq. Or So She Thought,
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/technology/
facebook-military-scam.html [https://perma.cc/WL7J-W8NJ].
326. See id.
327. See Jack Nicas, Another Victim in Facebook Romance Scams: A U.S. Congressman, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/technology/facebookmilitary-romance-scam.html [https://perma.cc/XH3F-FFZF] (describing Rep. Kinzinger’s
frustrations in dealing with impostor scams over several years and stories about the victims
who were deceived by the imposture of his identity); Letter from Adam Kinzinger, Member
of Cong., to Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman, CEO, Facebook, Inc. (July 31, 2019),
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1544-kinzinger-letter-to-zuckerberg/
553570d65fe47a065b04/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/KH6S-4NFR].
328. See Nicas, supra note 327.
329. Id.
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330

ers. Perhaps more verification could be required, even if it slows
down platform entry and causes users to balk due to extra privacy
concerns. These capabilites leave Facebook in the best position to
internalize the costs of mitigating the risks of imposture on their
platform. Of course, if Facebook becomes safer, the scammers will
flee elsewhere. It is more expensive, however, for scammers to
move away from safer, popular platforms to darker corners of the
Internet where achieving scale is more difficult. Given this increased cost, the marginal impostor will no longer find it profitable
to conduct scams, and thus the total number of impostor scams
will decrease, at least temporarily. Additionally, if Facebook truly
becomes safer, the public may place less trust in platforms that
cannot verify user identity, incentivizing all of these platforms to be
safer from fraud.
Naturally, dating-service sites and apps have become attractive
hosts for impostor scammers. By 2015, Pew reported that nearly 15
331
percent of American adults reported using dating sites or apps.
Just in the prior two years, usage had been increasing substantially
332
across age demographics. At the very least, platforms should bear
the costs of enhanced verification, additional education, and warnings for users to prevent impostors from using a false identity to
333
create the appearance of a romantic interest that will convince
334
the target to send money to them. Dating sites, like the proliferation of automated telephone technology, have enabled scammers
to operate inexpensively, at scale, and at a safe distance. Before the
advent of internet technology and social media, romance scam335
mers would have to try to pull off these schemes in person.

330. Todd Haselton, Facebook Content that Gets You Banned According to Community Standards, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/facebook-content-thatgets-you-banned-according-to-community-standards.html [https://perma.cc/9MPS-FBXG].
331. Aaron Smith, 15% of American Adults Have Used Online Dating Sites or Mobile Dating
Apps, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/02/11/15percent-of-american-adults-have-used-online-dating-sites-or-mobile-dating-apps/
[https://perma.cc/E96U-6KA4].
332. Id.
333. In this context, this is known as “catfishing.” See Catfishing, URB. DICTIONARY,
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Catfishing [https://perma.cc/E6FVK73B].
334. For an example of warnings about these scams and safety recommendations, see
Lisa Copeland, 9 Tips to Keep You Safe from the Scammers on Online Dating Sites, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/online-dating-scammerstips_b_6594250 [https://perma.cc/2LEE-G8SJ] (tips from a dating coach for identifying
such scams and taking precautions to avoid them).
335. Apparently, they still do. The elderly appear to provide targets for cruel, in-person,
versions of these scams, though not all of them conceal identity, just true motive. See Pam
Zekman, 2 Investigators: Sham Marriage Drains Elderly Man’s Savings, CBS CHI. (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/11/18/2-investigators-sham-marriage-drains-elderlymans-savings/ [https://perma.cc/3FW2-SGBD].
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Again, scammers have always seemed to find avenues to exploit
all forms of technology, as it lowers the cost of imposture. This puts
more pressure on private and public actors to raise scam execution
costs. Social media and dating site providers are custodians of
identity and connection, and thus maintain an LCA status, carrying
some means of putting on the brakes and raising the costs of imposture. Placing direct financial liability on these sites may prove
impractical. But incentivizing platforms to make changes that protect users, either through required safety warnings and verification
procedures when using the service, or through altruisticallyinspired enhancement of voluntary measures already taken, could
prove socially fruitful and enhance welfare.
Further, all of these scams can be defanged somewhat if fund
transfer becomes more challenging for the scammers to realize. If
scammers cannot get paid, or if it becomes more difficult to get
paid, they will have to look for other, less convenient, means of acquiring cash. For example, after fraudulently creating a romantic
attachment through a fake identity on a dating site, the scammer
can fake a need for quick cash and can motivate those who trust
him to resort to unconventional means of transferring money to
him. With romance scams, as with all other impostor scams, money
can flow through devices like gift cards, reloadable stored value
cards, mobile payment services, or classic wire-transfer services.
Next, I discuss how pressure has begun to be applied, and could be
further placed, on these types of financial intermediaries to raise
the cost of perpetrating impostor fraud.
3. Payment Mechanisms
Of course, if scammers cannot get paid, or paid easily, their motivation will evaporate. Ultimately, nothing can stop scammers
from inducing victims from sending dollar bills through the mail
except the inconvenience and suspicion that may be raised from
doing so. Thus, wire service providers, including banks and entities
like Western Union, should enhance their warnings about impostors. For example, banks can warn customers about impostor fraud
during the mortgage lending escrow process, telling them to be
336
vigilant about directing wire transfers.

336. See Aly J. Yale, Real Estate Wire Fraud Is Real—And It Almost Happened to Me, FORBES
(May 7, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alyyale/2019/05/07/real-estate-wire-fraud-isreal-and-it-almost-happened-to-me/#dabb2781c47a [https://perma.cc/FK2X-6PQR] (describing how this type of scheme works).
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With respect to identity theft through credit and debit cards,
federal law shifts the weight of heavy losses to the financial institu337
tions with a cap on consumer exposure. By pushing more of the
responsibility onto the financial institutions, both the consumer
and the financial institution bear some incentive to take measures
to avoid fraud. Credit card charges can be canceled if the mark becomes aware of the fraud, depriving the scammer of the payment
making this payment system less ideal than other alternatives.
In recent years, impostor scammers have increasingly asked victims to use stored-value cards (gift cards) to enable easy and un338
traceable methods of transferring money. The FTC reports that
the number of victims reporting use of these gift cards rose 270
339
percent between 2015 and 2018. Gift and reloadable cards became the most common method of money transfer between victim
and scammer, a match with the dynamic of impostor fraud becoming the most frequently reported scam. As with many steps in the
impostor scamming chain, there are chokepoints for financial
transfers that regulators and merchants can use to slow fraud.
The FTC reports that “scammers are telling people to buy gift
cards at Walmart, Target, CVS, Walgreens, and other retail
340
shops.” Forty-two percent of victims have used Google Play and
341
iTunes cards for their payment. Retailers have the opportunity at
purchase to warn their customers about these scams. They can stop
shoppers who buy cards, or a certain dollar amount of these cards,
and warn them to be vigilant about scams. Customers can be required to sign electronic disclosures at the point of sale that can
warn of the traditional and most recent flavors of scams. Further,
providers of stored-value cards, like Google Play and iTunes, can
take a role in warning users about how they can be vehicles for
theft and deceit. Perhaps a twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour cooling
off period before stored-value card usage would enable some time
for consumers to figure out what may be happening. Although no
degree of warnings may dissuade an overly stressed consumer from
transferring money to a scammer, education, forced caution, and

337. The Fair Credit Billing Act caps consumer exposure to unauthorized credit card
use and charges to $50 if reported in a timely way. 41 U.S.C. § 1643. The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act provides a similar structure of caps for ATM and debit card consumer liability
for unauthorized use with some burden on the user for disclosure. Id. § 1693.
338. See Cristina Miranda, Scammers Demand Gift Cards, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER
INFO. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/10/scammers-demandgift-cards [https://perma.cc/5C4W-97Y5].
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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deliberation may diminish the utility of these instruments to impostors.
The cutting edge of payment systems also warrants monitoring.
The Fintech sector has enabled banks and credit card companies
to enable person-to-person money transfers, which may also pre342
sent novel technical challenges for consumers. Finance entities
using these applications, as well as their regulators, should promote consumer vigilance about transferring payments to people
they might not know, and offer verification services that will make
imposture difficult through these emergent technologies. As with
other chokepoints, consumer education, mandatory warnings, and
user verification can play a constructive role. Though these tools
may be new, as explained here at length, imposture is an established phenomenon hungry for new tools.
As with other tools exploited by fraudsters, the financial transfer
chokepoint presents an opportunity to slow down impostors—to
prevent them from achieving their payday at the very last step. Similarly, citizens, policymakers, and the financial sector must be vigilant about how impostors can abuse technical advances in this innovative arena. Those who commercially benefit from this
technology and these systems are closest to the potential solutions
to impostor fraud at this crucial juncture.
CONCLUSION
Fraud is an old problem, and impostor fraud is not only persistent but also prevalent as a social and economic scourge. The justification for fighting this type of fraud has never been higher, given
that the systems that impostors can appropriate and exploit have
never been more efficient and effective for them. Policymakers
should constantly scan the horizon to see how these scammers are
succeeding, identify the least-cost avoider chokepoints for this
fraud, and apply pressure. Given the tremendous power that impostor fraud has, the only prescriptions for slowing it down are vigilance and being as innovative as the fraudsters. To do any less will
only encourage the problem to expand.

342. See Erin Fonte, 2017 U.S. Regulatory Overview of Mobile Wallets and Mobile Payments, 17
WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 549 (2017) (describing the landscape of the challenges presented by mobile payments systems and associated risks).

